Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal
Volume 18 | Issue 2

Article 9

2001

Disadvantaged By Design: How the Law Inhibits
Agricultural Guest Workers from Enforcing Their
Rights
Michael Holley

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Holley, Michael (2001) "Disadvantaged By Design: How the Law Inhibits Agricultural Guest Workers from Enforcing Their Rights,"
Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal: Vol. 18: Iss. 2, Article 9.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol18/iss2/9

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Labor
and Employment Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact
lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Holley: Disadvantaged By Design: How the Law Inhibits Agricultural Guest

DISADVANTAGED BY DESIGN: HOW THE LAW
INHIBITS AGRICULTURAL GUEST WORKERS
FROM ENFORCING THEIR RIGHTS
Michael Holley*
I. INTRODUCTION

In the last few years, growers' have begun to demand more visas for
foreign guest workers who perform seasonal agricultural labor in the
United States. Almost every year since 1996, the growers' lobby has
pushed legislation that would streamline procedures for importing
seasonal workers under the federal H-2A agricultural guest worker
program ("H-2A program"). 2 These proposals, if passed, would have
increased twenty-fold the number of workers admitted into the United

*
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University of California (Boalt Hall) 1997; M.A. University of California, Santa Barbara, 1994;
B.A. Duke University, 1988.
1. The term "grower" is used throughout this Article to refer to the whole host of types of
agricultural employers, including everything from corporate farming to the individual proprietorship
farm.
2. The "H-2A Program" is jointly administered by the United States Department of Labor
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service allowing the admission of a non-immigrant alien, at
the request of a U.S. employer, to perform agricultural labor or services of a temporary or seasonal
nature under section 101(a)(15)(h)(ii)(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. See 8 U.S.C. §
l l01(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (1994); LINDA LEvtNE, FARM LABOR SHORTAGES AND IMMIGRATION
POLICY, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. FOR CONG. 1 (Dec. 20, 1999) [hereinafter CRS REP.] (explaining
how the 1999 Senate bill was introduced to substantially expand the H-2A program); Temporary
Agricultural Work Visa Programs:Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 37 (1997) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Bruce
Goldstein, Co-executive Director, Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc.); Press Release, Bruce Goldstein,
Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc., Analysis of Pombo H-2C Guestvorker Proposal,H.R. 4548 (Sept.
21, 2000) (on file with the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal) [hereinafter Goldstein, Press
Release); Amy Fagan, Compromise Possible on Farmworker Visa Measure, CQ MONITOR NEws,
Sept. 18, 2000 [hereinafter Fagan, Compromise] (providing background about visa legislation in the
House of Representatives in 2000); Amy Fagan, Contentious Markup of Foreign Agricultural Visa
Legislation, CQ MONITOR NEws, Sept. 19, 2000 [hereinafter Fagan, Contentious]; Michael Doyle,
Senator Leader Blocks Guestworker Deal: Valley Lawmakers, Farmers Lose as Program for
Foreign Workers Dies,FRESNO BEE (Cal.), Dec. 16, 2000, at A25.
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States each year under the H-2A program. Even without such
amendments, the use of H-2A workers has tripled from 1995 to 1999.'
Under the current H-2A statutes and federal regulations, H-2A
workers have, at least on paper, substantive rights superior to those of
domestic farmworkers. For example, H-2A workers are entitled to
higher rates of pay than domestic workers, free housing, and free
transportation to their job site. As one employer of H-2A workers
observes: "'[i]t's not cost-efficient' [.],,6
Notably, many of the progrower legislative proposals would hardly affect these substantive
rights.7 If H-2A workers are not cost effective, why are more and more
growers ready to jump through bureaucratic hoops to import H-2A
workers? There are two obvious possibilities: (1) there is a domestic
labor shortage, causing wages to rise such that H-2A workers will
actually be cost-effective, or (2) H-2A workers do not cost as much as it
appears on paper. A third possibility-that growers are ignoring the
bottom line-is highly unlikely in a business as competitive as
agriculture.
Over the past few years, several empirical studies, including a 1997
study by the U.S. General Accounting Office, have shown that there is
no shortage of farmworkers in the United States.8 At the peak of the
employment season about forty-four percent are jobless.' The real wage
for farmworkers has continued to drop over the last two decades,"' even
as the export of labor-intensive crops has increased." These studies and
statistics seem to belie the first proposal.

3. See Goldstein, Press Release, supra note 2.
4. See Susan Ferriss, Mexico's Fox to Push Fresh View of an Old Problem: Undocumented
Workers, Cox NEWS SERV., July 26, 2000 [hereinafter Ferriss, Mexico's].
5. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
6. Ned Glascock, Foreign Labor on Home Soil, NEWS & OBSERVER, Aug. 29, 1999, at IA.
7. See Fagan, Compromise, supra note 2; Fagan, Contentious,supra note 2.
8. See CRS REP., supra note 2, at 10, 12, 15; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICEREP.
TO CONGRESSIONAL CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, H-2A Agricultural Guestvorker Program:

Changes Could Improve Services to Employers and Better Protect Workers, 5 (GAO/HEHS-98-20
H-2A Guestworker Program, Dec. 31, 1997) [hereinafter GAO Report].
9. See Kala Mehta et al., A Demographic and Employment Profile of United States
Farmworkers,FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS SURVEY (NAWS) 19971998, at 25 (Mar. 2000) [hereinafter NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS SURVEY].
10. See GAO Report, supra note 8, at 96-97; Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Surveys Find Farm
Worker Pay Down for 20 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1997, at Al; Daniel Rothenberg,
Agriculture's Cynical Answer to Farm Workers' Poverty, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 4, 1999, at 29
[hereinafter Rothenberg, Agriculture's].
11. See Mario Obledo, On the Bracero'sBacks: Agriculture Can Prosper Without hflux of
Mexicans, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 30, 2000, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/jump30l.shtml (last visited Sept. 21, 2000).
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This Article investigates the second proposal-that H-2A workers
do not cost as much as they appear on paper. This Article proposes that
H-2A workers are currently desirable because they are especially
vulnerable. That is, H-2A workers are desirable because, as a practical
matter, they cannot hope to enforce their relatively generous substantive
rights. Federal statutes, regulations and case law have helped to render
H-2A workers vulnerable, inhibiting them from enforcing their
employment rights guaranteed by their H-2A contracts.
This Article takes the following approach. Section I briefly surveys
the history of seasonal farm labor in the United States, highlighting the
fact that growers have repeatedly been able to use the law to prevent
farmworkers from gaining compensation commensurate with the
difficulty of their labor. Section II looks specifically at the current H-2A
agricultural guest worker program, showing that the administrative and
judicial remedies available to H-2A workers are so inadequate that H-2A
workers are even more vulnerable to workplace abuses than are domestic
farmworkers. Finally, Section III suggests that, in order for the federal
government to satisfy provisions of both the H-2A statute and the North
American Free Trade Agreement, the federal government must, at the
very least, put H-2A workers on an equal footing with domestic workers
in terms of their ability to enforce their employment agreements.
II. A GENEALOGY OF AMERICA'S Low-WAGE FARMWORKER

"[Hie'sasfree as a bird of the air."-A grower describing the life
of a migrant farmworker.' 2 "When you leave home ....you are nothing,
nobody. "--A migrant farmworker describing the life of a migrant
farmworker 3
The starting point for analyzing farmworker issues is the
recognition that seasonal field work is generally undesirable work. 4
Farm work is physically taxing, requiring the day-long performance of
repetitive motions while stooping, kneeling, walking or crawling. It is
also extremely dangerous: farm work consistently ranks with mining and
construction work as one of the most dangerous occupations in the
12.
(1987).

DAVID MONTEJANO, ANGLOS AND MEXICANS IN THE MAKING OF TEXAS,

1836-1986 176

13. DANIEL ROTHENBERG, WITH THESE HANDS: THE HIDDEN WORLD OF MIGRANT
FARMWORKERS TODAY 28 (1998) [hereinafter ROTHENBERG, HANDS].

14.

See Balancing Acts: Towards A FairSeasonal Agricultural Workers Recruitment and

Employment Bargain, CARNEGIE

ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, May 19, 1999, available at

http://www.ceip.org/files/eventsL/balancingacts.asp
BalancingActs].

(last visited
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United States. 5 Exposure to pesticides is common in the fields, yet little
is done to protect farmworkers from those hazards. 6 Plus, most
farmworkers must travel from their homes to perform their work, living

in temporary, ramshackle shelters during the work season. 7 Finally, field
work is sporadic-it is difficult to predict when particular work seasons

will begin and it is uncertain how long they will last. Farmworkers
usually manage to get farm work for just twenty-three to twenty-five
weeks per year."

Today, farm work comprises just two percent of all employment in
the United States. 9 Other occupations, not associated with farm work,
are more appealing to job-seekers since they are not so arduous,
dangerous, do not require long absences from home, and provide a

steady, reliable income.Y Still this quantum of labor is indispensable to
agribusiness because certain tasks, such as harvesting delicate fruits and
vegetables, require human skills, hands and care. 2'
In fact, at harvest time, the demand for this temporary human labor
15. See Donna Glenn, DangerDown on the Farm, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 28, 1999, at

IA; see also Raul Hemandez, Dangeron the Farm,SCRIPPS-MCCLATCHY W. SERV., Aug. 8, 2000,
available at http://shns.scripps.com/cgi-bin/webed.show_story?pk=FARMDANGERS-08-08-00
(last visited Feb. 2, 2001) (adding that farming accidents are under-reported by about 30% to
100%).
16. See Viviana Patifio, Migrant Farm Worker Advocacy: Empowering the Invisible Laborer,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 47-48 (1987); Lela Klein, Labor Camps Deny Visitors to Migrant
Farm Workers, NEWS & REC. (Greensboro, N.C.), Feb. 24, 2000, at All (citing a 1999 report by
the Institute for Southern Studies that shows work conditions on many farms include exposure to
dangerous pesticides); Victoria Riskin & Mike Farrell, Profit on the Backs of Children, CLEVELAND
PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 16, 2000, at 9B (describing exposure to pesticides). This conclusion regarding
the lack of protection is also supported by the findings of Scott Cook, a law student at the University
of Texas, who reviewed the files of the Texas Department of Agriculture ("TDA") in fiscal year
1999. See Interview with Scott Cook, Law Student, University of Texas (Oct. 29, 2000). Cook
reviewed the files for all reported cases of pesticide exposure except for Region 4, the Dallas area.
See id. He ascertained that the TDA issued just a single administrative penalty, of six hundred
dollars, for exposing an agricultural field worker to pesticides. See id. By far, the most common
response by the TDA to a case of wrongfully exposing a worker to pesticides was to merely issue a
warning letter, rather than to impose an administrative penalty. See id.
17. See NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS SURVEY, supra note 9, at 20-21; Patiflo, supra
note 16, at 45 ("Actual farm worker housing is extremely substandard."); Raul Yzaguirre & Shelley
Davis, Life of a FarmworkerNo Bowl of Cherries,SEATTLE TIMES, June 24, 1999, at B5 (claiming
regulation housing for a migrant worker might be a "pup tent"); Jen McCaffery, Virginia'sMigrants
Easily Exploited, ROANOKE TIMES, Dec. 10, 2000, at Al (describing the practice of overcharging
for atrocious, overcrowded housing).
18. See NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS SURVEY, supra note 9, at 24; see also
Yzaguirre & Davis, supra note 17, at B5 ("[M]ost migrant workers spend half the year moving from
crop to crop.").
19. See ROTHENBERG, HANDS, supranote 13, at 62.
20. See BalancingActs, supra note 14; ROTHENBERG, HANDS, supranote 13, at 7.
21. See ROTHENBERG, HANDS, supranote 13, at 12.
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tends to be extraordinarily high because growers produce perishable
products whose values are dictated by a volatile commodity market. A
season's work and investment can be rendered worthless overnight by a
sudden change in market expectations or in the weather.' This
uncertainty makes the grower want to get all the goods to market as soon
as possible.' As a result, the grower demands farm labor on the shortest
possible notice and in the greatest possible quantity (and also,
correlatively, for the shortest period of time possible).24 For example, in
Texas, before cotton production was firmly tied to eastern commodity
markets, the cotton harvest regularly lasted ten weeks. 1 But once cotton
was harnessed to those markets, the timing of the marketing became of
paramount importance and so Texas cotton farmers insisted on
harvesting their crop in the first two weeks of the ten week harvest
season, thereby increasing the demand for field workers by five hundred
percent. 6 Assuming that growers would like to harvest their crops on the
first day possible, theoretically, the demand for farm labor is nearly
unlimited.
In practice, though, how is this potentially unlimited demand for
difficult, dangerous, short-term labor actually satisfied? Many workers
travel the country following the usual harvests and looking for work
("freewheeling"), while many others are recruited by labor contractors in
close proximity to their homes-usually in home base states such as
Texas, Florida and California-to work a certain season.27 Still others are
recruited by labor contractors at the United States-Mexico border where
they enter the country, some legally, others illegally, to obtain work.2 In
any case, the grower usually must manage to attract a significant number
of workers to his fields from hundreds or thousands of miles away in
order to work during an unpredictable and relatively brief time period.
All this must be done despite the language barrier, the farmworkers'
usual lack of a stable address or telephone number, and the farmworkers'
financial situation.
It would appear that there are two types of methods a grower uses
22. See id. at 71-72.
23. See id.; MONTEjANO, supranote 12, at 214.
24. See id. ("[T]hese worldwide market linkages generated an interest in having a large
disposable labor force that could be rushed into the fields one day and withdrawn or transferred to
other fields the next.").
25. See id. at 177.
26. See id.
27. This is a great simplification of what occurs. See, e.g., ROTHENBERG, HANDS, supra note
13, at 10; Patiflo, supranote 16, at 43.
28. See MONTEJANO, supranote 12, at 204.
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to get the right number of workers to the fields at the right time to
perform this difficult, dangerous, and sporadic field work: (1) by
offering a premium wage and/or benefits (as done with teachers,
roughnecks and many construction workers, for example), or (2) by
recruiting workers who are effectively constrained to accept work
regardless of the conditions. 2 Usually when an unskilled worker obtains
a permanent, full-time job working at minimum wage near his home in
an air conditioned fast food restaurant, for example, it would take
something extra to get that same person to travel far from home to
perform taxing physical labor for weeks on end: either the employer
offers extra benefits, or the worker must be extraordinarily vulnerable.
A quick look at the actual circumstances of farm work makes it
evident that growers have not offered premium benefits. Farmworkers
are paid at a rock-bottom rate: less than half the hourly wage rate of
nonsupervisory workers in the private non-farm sector.3 ' While such
non-farmworkers are paid on average $12.78 per hour, farmworkers are
either paid an average of $6.18 per hour, or slightly higher than the
federal minimum wage, which is lower than some States' minimum
wage.32 As explained later on, these minimal wages often must
compensate seasonal farmworkers not only for their hourly labor, but
also for travel time, expenses, and housing costs while performing that
job. Moreover, farmworkers manage to capture very little of the surplus
value of their labor. For example, the United Farmworkers emphasized,
when recently campaigning to unionize strawberry workers, if
Americans paid just five cents more for their two-dollar pints of
strawberries, the field workers' wages could be doubled.33 Americans
only spend approximately eight percent of their income on food and
alcohol, easily less than half of any other nation in the world, besides the

29. See ROTHENBERG, HANDS, supranote 13, at 72.
30. The leading recruiter of H-2A workers has stated: "'Nobody wants to do this kind of work
[i.e., agricultural] anymore' .... 'Burger King can't find people to flip burgers for six bucks an
hour, and that's indoor work and it's a lot less physically demanding."' Ned Glascock, Foreign
Laboron Home Soil, NEWS & OBSERVER, Aug. 29, 1999, at IA.
31. See CRS REP., supra note 2, at 1.
32. See id. Ten states and the District of Columbia have set a minimum wage which exceeds
the federal minimum wage of $5.15/hour: Washington and Oregon at $6.50; Connecticut, Rhode
Island and Washington DC at $6.15; Massachusetts at $6.00; California and Vermont at $5.75;
Alaska and Delaware at $5.65; Hawaii at $5.25. See Robert D. Hershey, Jr., The Cost of Not Livh:g
on a $5.15 Minimum, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19,2000, at Cl.
33. See Julie Chao, Stravber. Rally Seen As Sign of Power, Hope, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 14,
1997, at A-I; Jane M. Von Bergen, Acme Supports Improved Conditions for Strawberry Pickers,
PHILA. INQUIRER, May 31, 1997, at D1.
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French who spend about sixteen percent.' Finally, in the labor-intensive
sector of fresh fruits, vegetables, and horticulture, U.S. agribusiness
nearly quadrupled its exports between 1986 and 1997. 35 Therefore, it is
evident that both agribusiness and consumers are benefiting from the

farmworkers' low wages. 6
Looking at the actual circumstances of farm work makes it evident
that historically growers tend to rely on non-economic coercion to get
farm work done, rather than bargaining at arm's length for the labor
needed. For example, in antebellum America, slaves were forced to do

most of America's farm work. Following the Civil War, to continue
tying workers to the land which they worked for their creditors'

(formerly, "owners"') profit, debts sanctioned by law replaced the legal
institution of slavery. 8 With the advent of national markets for
agricultural commodities in the late 19th century, growers no longer

34. See Balancing Acts, supranote 14; see also ROTHENBERG, HANDS, supra note 13, at 59.
35. See Obledo, supranote 11.
36. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS' FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION INTHE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 138
(2000) (citing a 1994 U. S. Department of Labor report which concluded that "migrant workers,
their families and communities, rather than producers, tax-payers and consumers, bear the high
costs of agriculture's endemic labor market instability").
37. See Jim Chen, OfAgriculture's FirstDisobedience and Its Fruit,48 VAND. L. REV*. 1261,
1277 (1995) ("Slavery, simply put, was American agriculture's original sin.").
38. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY 28 (Dover Publications 1958) (1911)
(defining debt as "[a]n ingenious substitute for the chain and whip of the slave-driver"); see Marc
Linder, Farm Workers and the FairLabor StandardsAct: Racial Discrimination in the New Deal,
65 TEX. L. REV. 1335, 1349-50 (1987) (discussing discriminatory legislation which kept tenant
farmers in debt); William Levernier & John B. White, The Determinants of Poverty in Georgia's
Plantation Belt: Explaining the Differences in Measured Poverty Rates, 57 AM. J. ECON. & SOC.,
47, 52 (1998). The authors explained how sharecropping was the method for obtaining workers by
stating:
After the Civil War, the mobilizing mechanism that produced an adequate supply of
farm labor and allowed the continuance of profitable, large-scale agrarian enterprises
was tenant farming, or sharecropping. In sharecropping, the tenant farmer (i.e.,
sharecropper) was allowed to farm land owned by someone else in return for a share of
the revenue obtained from the sale of his crops. Under this system, at the beginning of
the growing season the landowner provided the sharecropper with the seed and other
materials necessary to farm the land. The sharecropper would pay the landowner for the
seed and other materials he was provided with when the crops were sold at the end of the
growing season. Because the sharecropper owed the landowner a debt for the entire
growing season, this arrangement effectively obligated the sharecropper to work on the
land for the entire crop season. A second factor that allowed the continuance of the
plantation economy in the post-Antebellum period was the absence of alternative labor
opportunities for unskilled labor. This was especially true for blacks, who knew they
would face discrimination in the North were they to migrate from the South in search of
better job opportunities.
Id. at 52.
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found it profitable to have tenant farmers living on "their" land year
round-it became cheaper to get large numbers of workers to come
work for short bursts when needed." A pool of landless peasants, who
migrated to do seasonal work, gradually replaced the sharecropper
population. 40
To manipulate this new class of landless peasants, some nineteenth
century growers used vagrancy laws to force individuals to do farm
work when wages alone were not high enough to entice them.4' They
also convinced their county governments to institute pass systems,
which prevented workers from leaving a particular county to work
elsewhere when higher wages were beckoning.42 Sometimes they would
use armed force, such as shotguns, to drive workers away when they
complained about being shorted on work or wages. 43 These so-called
"shotgun settlements" were effected either by the grower himself, or by
enlisting the aid of the local sheriff.44
In many ways, the New Deal forms the cornerstone of the modern
era in American history. Unfortunately, the New Deal did not eradicate
the systematic abuses of farmworkers, but rather enshrined it in new
institutions. The New Deal legislation effectively "institutionalized the
second-class status of agricultural laborers, 45 because it explicitly
denied farmworkers important substantive rights that it granted to all
other.workers. 46 For example, farmworkers were deprived of the right to
collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act and the
right to minimum or overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.4'7 As Professor Mark Linder has shown, these farmworker
exclusions were the product of racial discrimination-primarily against
African-Americans-as New Dealers agreed to write these exclusions
into legislation in order to win support from Southern democrats. 48 These
39. See MONTEJANO, supranote 12, at 175-77.
40. See id. at 175-76.
41. See id. at 178.
42. See id. at 205.
43. See id. at 203.
44. See MONTEJANO, supranote 12, at 202-03.
45. ROTHENBERG, HANDs, supranote 13, at 205.
46. See Linder, supranote 38, at 1335.
47. See id. at 1336 & n.12.
48. See id. at 1336; Laurence E. Norton II & Marc Linder, Down and Out in Weslaco, Texas
and Washington, D.C.: Race-Based Discrimination Against Farm Workers Under Federal
Unemployment Insurance, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 177, 191-98 (1995-96) (arguing that in order
to gain Southern Congressional votes, New Deal legislation purposely excluded farm workers by
allowing discrimination of African Americans in the South to continue). Of course, in regions like
Texas, this race discrimination would have been aimed at Latinos. See MONTEJANO, supranote 12,
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exclusions had the intended impact: while farmworkers earned seventy
percent of the industrial wage rate in the early 1900s, they earned just
twenty-five percent of that rate by 1940.49
During the New Deal era, the federal government did try to take
some responsibility for farm labor. The federal government created

employment offices, which aimed to bring job-seekers in contact with
labor-seekers. 0 It also built labor camps, where workers could live for a
nominal amount."' Growers opposed the housing project because the
farmworkers living at these camps were unusually well-positioned to

bargain with employers (i.e., they could not be evicted, could hold out

for better wages, and were not tied to a certain employer).' 2 That is,
growers complained about governmental involvement insofar as it

improved conditions for workers. 3 However, growers did seek federal
intervention when the federal government decided to supply desperate

Mexican workers. From World War II to 1964, the federal government
administered the bracero program-the United State's most ambitious
guest worker program to date." While the bracero program was used to
import a peak of 400,000 Mexican workers per year,"5 another guest
worker program, known as the H-2 program, was initiated in 1943 to
import Caribbean workers to the East coast in much smaller numbers. 6
The official purpose of the bracero program was to bring in
Mexican workers to alleviate the declared shortage of domestic workers
during World War I s but not to displace domestic workers." However,
at 190, 191 (discussing how "agricultural labor became defined as 'Mexican work' in Texas); see
also Chen, supra note 37, at 1281 ('The contemporary agricultural exemption from the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") differs from the historical institution of slavery only in degree and not in
kind.").
49. See ROTHENBERG, HANDS, supranote 13, at 35.
50. See CINDY HAHAMOV1TCH, THE FRUITS OF THEIR LABOR: ATLANTIC COAST
FARMiWORKERS AND THE MAKING OF MIGRANT POVERTY, 1870-1945, at 166 (1997).
51. See id. at 156-70 (describing the federal Migratory Camp Program).
52. See id. at 170.
53. See id. at 170-72; Maria Elena Bickerton, Note, Prospectsfor a Bilateral Immigration
Agreement with Mexico: Lessonsfrom the Bracero Program,79 TEX. L. REV. 895, 896-97 (2001).
54. See David IV. Eaton, Transformation of the Mexican MaquiladoraIndustry: The Driving
Force Behind the Creation of a NAFTA Regional Economy, 14 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 747, 756
(1997); GAO Report, supranote 8, at 18-19; Hearing,supranote 2, at 37.
55. See Hearing,supranote 2, at 37.
56. See id.; Eaton, supra note 54, at 757. In 1986, the H-2 program was modified to create
two classes of H-2 guest workers: the H-2A workers who performed seasonal worker (usually
agricultural work) and the H-2B workers who performed year-round labor. See GAO Report, supra
note 8, at 19 & n.6. The H-2A program is the subject of this Article.
57. See GAO Report, supra note 8, at 18.
58. See ERNESTO GALARZA, MERCHANTS OF LABOR: THE MEXICAN BRACERO STORY 47
(1964).
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the program continued after the troops returned home, and in 1951
Congress passed Public Law 78, which re-established the bracero
program and reiterated its bedrock principle: to avoid causing adverse
effect on domestic workers or their working conditions.59 Therefore, the
law included certain safeguards. Growers had to (1) offer domestic
workers the same work at the same terms as braceros; (2) certify that
they could not get domestic workers for the job before importing
braceros; and (3) obtain the Labor Department's approval of the
"prevailing wage," being paid to braceros.'
These safeguards sounded good on paper, but application was
another matter. In his comprehensive study of the bracero program,
Ernesto Galarza concluded that "statements of policy had little
connection with the real state of affairs."'" For example, the Labor
Department had so few statisticians it could not determine what the
actual "prevailing wages" were for farmworkers, so it ended up simply
adopting the growers' representation of what the proper wage should
be. 62 The Department's "prevailing wage" turned out to be "only an
official veneer laid upon [grower] association[s'] wage fixes." 3 Not
surprisingly, the net result of the bracero program was a depression of
agricultural wages and the displacement of domestic workers.6 4 From
1951 to 1957, the percentage of braceros, comprising the total seasonal
farm labor force, more than doubled from twelve percent to twenty-eight
percent. 65 In some regions, braceros comprised almost one-hundred
percent of the seasonal workforce.6 In short, the bracero program, like
the New Deal exclusions, had its expected effects on domestic
farmworkers. 67
Why did growers shift so quickly from domestic workers to

59. See id. at 72-73, 199.
60. See id. at 78, 130-31, 134, 136-37, 163.
61. Id. at 218.
62. See id. at 121, 135-42, 199.
63. GALARZA, supranote 58, at 136.
64. See id. at 199-200, 203.

65. See id. at 94.
66. See id. at 94-95.
67. See id. at 199-200. Of course, there is nothing necessarily wrong with transferring jobs
from Americans to Mexicans. It represents a much needed transfer of wealth. Growers did not
overlook their own generosity, promoting the bracero program as one designed to educate and
financially assist Mexicans. See GALARZA, supra note 58, at 229-30. But the problem is that this
transfer of wages from American workers to Mexican workers was being made solely in order that
growers could capture a greater percentage of the profits from the workers' labor. In other words, it
was being made in order that, whichever workers ended up getting the jobs available, those workers
would be guaranteed to be working in conditions far inferior to anyone else's in the United States,
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braceros? According to growers, the braceros were more dependable
than domestic workers, but it seems that "dependable" was merely a
euphemism for "vulnerable." ' Braceros were so vulnerable, and
therefore dependable, because they had paid bribes and fees with
borrowed money to get the chance to work in the United States, they
desperately needed wages, they were isolated in a labor camp in a
foreign country where they did not speak the predominant language,69
and they were accustomed to living under an authoritarian regime.
Growers profited from this vulnerability by importing an excessive
number of braceros, giving them minimal work, over-charging them for
meals of the poorest quality, and housing them in squalid quarters. 71 All
of these violations effectively meant more money in the growers'
pockets.
Looking back, a bracero, who is happy to have had the opportunity
to support his family by working in the United States, describes his
experience: "They treated us like animals .... But, as a bracero, you
knew you couldn't complain."7 2 This is the most fundamental expression
of the growers' advantage in using braceros: a bracero knew he could
not complain. If he complained, he would be fired without any practical
recourse, blacklisted and sent home with debts still owing. As Galarza's
study shows, due to the many physical and procedural impediments to
filing a complaint, braceros rarely even lodged them, much less
prevailed. 7 Although violations were widespread, only one in every
4,300 braceros officially voiced a grievance. 74
The bracero program ground to a halt in 1964.7 Upon its demise the
Chicano movimiento and the union organizing efforts of the United
Farmworkers and Texas Farmworkers Unions followed.7 6 These social
68. See id. at 237.
69. See id. at 86, 196; ROTHENBERG, HANDS, supra note 13, at 37.
70. See GALARZA, supranote 58, at 226.
71. See id. at 183-97.
72. ROTHENBERG, HANDS, supranote 13, at 38.
73. See GALARZA, supra note 58, 197-98 (describing the steps in a bracero's grievance
"process": 1) complain to the field man for the growers' association; 2) next, move on to the
association manager; 3) then speak to the local Employer Service Representative representatives
(usually available only via the association or employer); 4) then complain to the overworked
Mexican consul; and 5) complain to the Labor Department for a process which offered no right to
present evidence or participate.) In 1959, the Labor Department stated: "[T]he first responsibility for
compliance with regulations is upon the growers themselves. Then the state has authority, and the
Federal Government should be the last to take action." Id. at 169.
74. See id. at 183.
75. See Eaton, supranote 54, at 756-57.
76. See generally F. ARTuRO ROSALES, CHICANO!: THE HISTORY OF THE MEXICAN
AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 130-51,

215-25 (1996) (explaining the rise of what
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movements reaped some gains for farmworkers. By 1966, most
farmworkers were partially incorporated into the Fair Labor Standard

Act and therefore covered by its minimum wage provisions." In 1963, in
order to give federal protections to farmworkers, Congress passed the
Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, and then strengthened it in

1974.78 Since this Act proved ineffective, Congress replaced it with a
somewhat stronger Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers'

Protection Act ("AWPA") in 1983. 79
AWPA gave farmworkers important rights vis-A-vis their
employers, which were needed in their line of work and due to their
susceptibility to exploitation." Today, AWPA continues to provide

farmworkers with many rights. First, it provides them access to federal
court, by creating federal question jurisdiction over such claims."2
Second, its venue provision gives farmworkers the ability to establish
proper venue in any court where personal jurisdiction exists over the
defendant.'

Third, its detailed and broad anti-retaliation provision

protects farmworkers from retaliation.83 Lastly, it gives farmworkers
eventually became known as the United Farm Workers in California, and union organizing activities
in Texas during the 1960s).
77. See Linder, supra note 39, at 1336-37 (citing the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 203(a), 80 Stat. 833, 833-34 (1966)).
78. See Pub. L. No. 88-582, 78 Stat. 920, 920 (1965); Jeanne E. Varner, Picking Produceand
Employees: Recent Developments in FartmvorkerInjustice, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 433, 436 (1996).
79. See Pub. L. No. 97-470, 96 Stat. 2583, 2583 (1983) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872
(1994)); Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American
Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1007
(1999).
80. See Beliz v. W.H. McLeod & Sons Packing Co., 765 F.2d 1317, 1332 (5th Cir. 1985)
(stating the purpose of federal farmworker legislation is to "deter and correct the exploitive
practices that have historically plagued the migrant farm labor market").
81. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 1854 (a) (1994).
82. AWPA includes a special venue provision: "Any person aggrieved by a violation of this
chapter... may file suit in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties... without regard to the citizenship of the parties .... 29 U.S.C. § 1854(a). This provision
has regularly been interpreted as conferring venue coextensive with personal jurisdiction. See
Stewart v. Woods, 730 F. Supp. 1096, 1097 (M.D. Fla. 1990); Lozano v. Gonya Farms, Inc., No. M89-119, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 1990) (order denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or
Transfer)(declaring venue proper under 29 U.S.C. § 1854(a), which "codifies the significant policy
interests behind insuring that migrant workers have access to the judicial system").
83. See 29 U.S.C. § 1855(a). The prohibited activities are:
No person shall intimidate, threaten, restrain, coerce, blacklist, discharge, or in any
manner discriminate against any migrant or seasonal agricultural worker because such
worker has, with just cause, filed any complaint or instituted, or caused to be instituted,
any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in
any such proceedings, or because of the exercise, with just cause, by such worker on
behalf of himself or others of any right or protection afforded by this chapter.
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explicit substantive rights governing workers' recruitment, employment,
housing, and transportation."' Substantively, AWPA basically requires
growers to make their promises in writing and then fulfill them; and it
also requires growers, who provide housing or transportation, to ensure
that those services meet minimum health and safety standards."s
Furthermore, beginning in around 1974, legal aid programs funded by
the federal Legal Services Corporation began employing more advocates
who specialized in farmworker issues." In the eyes of at least one
contemporary grower: "There are a lot of new laws that have created an
incredible amount of rights for fannworkers."87
With all of these new rights, post-AWPA farmworkers could be
depended on to make more complaints than their predecessors. 8 But
these rights have not been asserted so often as to put farmworkers'
employment conditions on a par with those of other unskilled laborers in
the United States. As one lifetime advocate remarks, "the situation is not
much better now than it was in the 1960s."" Today, seventy-three
percent of farmworkers earn less than $10,000 per year, 90 placing sixtyone percent of farmworkers living below the poverty level.9' Those who
work exclusively in agriculture average under $6,000 per year in
wages."z As of 1998, more than ten percent of farmworkers did not get
paid the minimum wage. 93 A recent investigation "found an
astonishingly high risk of heart disease, stroke, hypertension, diabetes
and obesity" among the migrant farmworkers studied. 9 Despite this
problem, farmworkers' use of needs-based social services is minimal, at
just seventeen percent.95 In fact, despite the "incredible amount of rights"
that farmworkers have gained and despite the boom in the export of
84. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1844 (1994).
85. This is an extreme simplification of the substantive provisions of AWPA.
86. See Varner, supranote 78, at 436; Alan W. Houseman, PoliticalLessons: Legal Services
for the Poor-A Commentary, 83 Geo. L.J. 1669, 1684 (1995). See generally Warren E. George,
Development of the Legal Services Corporation,61 CORNELL L. REV. 681 (1976) (discussing the
Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974 and efforts to provide legal council for those who were
otherwise unable to obtain sufficient legal services).
87. ROTHENBERG, HANDS, supranote 13, at 88.
88. See Vamer, supranote 78, at 436.
89. ROTHENBERG, HANDS, supranote 13, at 206; see HAHRAOVITCH, supra note 51 at 13.
90. See NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS SURVEY, supra note 9, at 46.

91. See id. at39.
92. See Hollis Pfitsch, Guestvorker Proposal Threatens All Workers' Rights, SEATrLE
TiMES, Sept. 27,2000.
93. See NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS SURVEY, supranote 9, at 33.
94. Still a Harvest of Shame, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 15, 2000, at A34; see also Brian Melley,
Fan Scene: Study FindsMany Farm Hands in PoorHealth, Assoc. PRESS, Nov. 28,2000.
95. See National AGRICULTURAL WORKERS SURVEY, supranote 9, at 41.
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labor-intensive agricultural products, farmworkers' real wages have
dropped by twenty to twenty-five percent over the past two decades,
falling farther behind non-farm sector wages.96
The downward spiral is partly the consequence of the continued
handicaps that federal law imposes on farmworkers. Farmworkers are

the only statistically significant group of workers that remain excluded
from FLSA's overtime provisions, 97' and they also remain deprived of the
right to engage in collective bargaining." Farmworkers' increasing

poverty is also a reason why growers have managed to keep using
desperate Mexican and Central American workers en masse by illegally
hiring undocumented workers even after the discontinuation of the

bracero program. 99 In 1986, Congress approved an amnesty for seasonal
workers, which allowed approximately

1.2 million undocumented

workers to become legal permanent residents.

This number of workers

comprised about thirty-one to fifty percent of the nation's farm

workforce at that time.'0 ' However, this "fix" did not last for long. Upon
gaining legal status, farmworkers tend to switch to safer, steadier and
less arduous work. '°2 Also, because most farmworkers do not engage in
field work after the age of fourty-four, most of the workers amnestied in

1986 are, in the year 2000, already reaching the end of their work life as
fannworkers 3 It is estimated that roughly fourty to fifty percent of
today's seasonal farmworkers are undocumented.""
96. See Greenhouse, supra note 10, at Al; Rothenberg, Agriculture's,supra note 10, at 29.
97. See Linder, supra note 39, at 1335.
98. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 37, at 11; see also Kayce R. Compton, Note,
Defeating the Agricultural Exemption: The NorrisLaGuardiaAct as a Meansfor Collective Action
forAgriculturalLabor, 74 N.D. L. REV. 509, 520-21 (1998).
99. See Philip Martin, Guest Worker Programsfor the 21st Century, BACKGROUNDER
(Center for Immigration Studies), Apr. 2000, at 2 [hereinafter Martin, Guest Worker].
100. See 8 C.F.R. § 210 (2000); Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 8
U.S.C. § 1101 (1994); Philip L. Martin, Economic Integration and Migration: The Case of NAFTA,
3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF.419, 428 (1998) [hereinafter Martin, Economic]. Pursuant to
this Special Agricultural Worker program ("SAW"), applicants could become legal permanent
residents of the United States if they could show that they had performed agricultural services for at
least 90 days during the one year period ending May 1986. See 8 U.S.C. § 1160(a)(1)(B) (1994);
Martin, Guest Worker, supranote 99, at 2.
101. See Martin, Guest Worker, supranote 100, at 2; CRS REP., supranote 2, at 2.
102. See generally The Extent, Pattern, and Contributions of Migrant Labor in the NAFTA
Countries:An Overview, at 8 (Conference of Agricultural Migrant Labor in North America, NAID
Center, UCLA, Feb. 2000).
103. See CRS REP., supra note 2, at 5.
104. See NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS SURVEY, supra note 9, at 22 (reporting fiftytwo percent of farmworkers as being undocumented); Martin, Guest Worker, supra note 99, at 2
(about fifty percent of farmworkers being undocumented); Marcus Stem, Lobbying on Guest
Workers Bears Fruit: Growers Win Backing of FormerOpponent, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar.
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Are these undocumented workers necessary to get the crops
picked? Statistics say "no." A recent study shows that, even in July,
when the demand for farm labor is at its peak, only fifty-six percent of
farmworkers were employed. 05 From 1994 to 1998, a period during
which the unemployment levels for all other Americans decreased, the
unemployment level for farmworkers remained essentially unchanged.'
Meanwhile, there was a decrease in the average number of work days,
which a farmworker could obtain.0 7 As the Congressional Research
Service recently concluded, the foregoing statistics indicate a surplus,
rather than a shortage, of farmworkers in the United States.0 8 Moreover,
after investigating this in 1997, the U. S. General Accounting Office
found that "[a] widespread farm labor shortage does not appear to exist
now and is unlikely in the near future."' In 1998, based on a Labor
Department study, former Labor Secretary, Robert Reich, agreed stating:
"In fact, there's an overabundance of (resident) farm workers and they
tend to be very poor."'""
Like any other group of employers, growers like their workers to be
plentiful and vulnerable, which guarantees that they will be
dependable."' Undocumented workers are vulnerable, but they are not
guaranteed to remain plentiful. In recent years, the federal government
has again made overtures-such as INS sting operations against
employers of undocumented workers and Border Patrol operations that
close parts of the border-towards actually preventing the entry or
employment of undocumented workers. 12 When growers see their
in this manner, they turn back
inexhaustible reserve of labor' threatened
3
1
"solution."
worker
to the guest
at Al (estimating thirty-eight percent of farmworkers are undocumented).
See CRS REP., supra note 2, at 11.
See id. at 10.
See id. at 12.
See id. at 10, 15.
GAO Report, supra note 8, at 6.
Stem, supra note 104, at Al; LAW OFFICES OF CALIFORNIA RURAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
FOUNDATION, JOBLESSNESS IN THE CALIFORNIA HEARTLAND 3 (2000) (showing high rates of
unemployment in agricultural counties in California in 1999) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA RURAL].
11. See notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
112. See Midwest: HispanicImmigrants, 5 RURAL MIGRATION NEWS, Apr. 1999, available at
http:llmigmtion.ucdavis.edulrmnlArchiveRMN/apr._1999-03.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2001); Dan
Sewell, Raids on Immigrant Workers Hinders Industry's Operation, MONITOR (McAllen, Tex.),
May 25, 1998, at 2D; Jingle Davis, Coverdell to Push Changes in Law on Migrant Workers,
ATLANTA CONST., May 21, 1998, at E8; Doyle, supra note 2, at A25 (reporting sums spent on
lobbying for year 2000 legislation).
113. See Davis, supra note 113, at E8; Salazar-Calderon v. Presidio Valley Farmers Ass'n, 765
F.2d 1334, 1338 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he Immigration and Naturalization Service informed growers
10, 1998,
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
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Thus, since the mid-1990s, growers have been engaged in lobbying
efforts to expand the H-2A guest worker program."" This program was
instituted in 1943 to import a small number of Caribbean workers to the
east coast to labor mostly in the sugar and apple harvests."5 In 1986, the

H-2A program was revamped to streamline the procedures, which
growers had to follow in order to use the program." 6 Under the current

H-2A program, a grower may import guest workers to perform seasonal
agricultural labor if, among other things, the grower: (1) gains
certification from both the Labor Department and the Attorney General
that there is a shortage of domestic workers and the employment of guest

workers will not adversely affect domestic labor;"7 (2) engages in
affirmative and adequate recruitment efforts to employ domestic workers
before importing H-2A workers;"' and (3) guarantees certain minimal

in the Valley that it intended to step up its enforcement activity [with respect to the employment of
undocumented workers] in the area. Aware that the effect of such enforcement would be to cut off
labor needed for the 1977 harvest, the growers investigated INS's H-2 [guest worker] visa
program.").
114. See
Agribusiness:
Long-Term
Contributions
Trends,
available
at,
http:llwww.opensecrets.orglindustriesindus.asp?Ind=A (last visited Oct. 10, 2000); see also Stem,
supra note 105, at Al; Bob Buyer, State Farm BureauSets Its Goalsfor 1999, BuFFALo NEWS, Jan.
23, 1999, at IC; Teresa Puente, On the Record: Dolores Huerta, Farm Workers [sic] Leader, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 22, 1998, § 2, at 3; Esther Schrader, Widening the Field of Workers, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
26, 1999, at Al.
115. See Hearing,supra note 2, at 37.
116. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a), 1184, 1188 (1994); 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.90-655.113
(2000) (showing Department of Labor regulations); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h) (2000) (presenting the INS
regulations); H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 97-102 (1986); Hearing,supra note 2, at 37-38.
117. Employers who are unable to find sufficient U.S. farmworkers may apply for permission
to recruit and employ foreign guest workers. See 8 U.S.C. § 1188(a). In order for the Attorney
General (via the INS, as designated in 8 C.F.R. § 100.2) to approve such a request for guest
workers, the employer must first petition the Secretary of Labor to certify that:
[T]here are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, and qualified, and who will be
available at the time and place needed, to perform the labor or services involved in the
petition, and ...the employment of the alien in such labor or services will not adversely
affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly
employed.
Id.
118. Employers are required to recruit U.S. workers by circulating job offers through the
United States Employment Service system, an interstate network using state employment services to
communicate job opportunities throughout the United States, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 49-49(l)(l) (1994 &
Supp. IV 1994), and independently to engage in "positive recruitment efforts within a multi-state
region of traditional or expected labor supply." 8 U.S.C. § 1188(b)(4); see 20 C.F.R. § 655.105, The
Regional Administrator of the Employment and Training Administration of the Department of
Labor will certify that the employer may hire sufficient temporary foreign workers to fill remaining
needs based on whether the employer has made sufficient recruitment efforts and whether the
employer has not adversely affected U. S.workers by offering foreign workers better conditions of
employment than extended to U.S. workers. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.92, .102(a), .105(a).
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conditions of employment." 9 Even after the H-2A workers have begun
the farm work, the employer must ensure the preference for domestic
workers by hiring any domestic worker who applies for the farm work
during the first fifty percent of the H-2A employment season (the fifty
percent guarantee).' 20 In 1996, 1998, 1999 and again in 2000, Congress
came close to approving bills that would have (1) amended the H-2A
program to allow for the importation of as many as one million guest
workers, (2) relaxed housing and wage requirements, and (3)
streamlined certification procedures.' In January 2001, the Bush
Administration and Republican Senators immediately began pushing for
a new guest worker agreement with Mexico.'2
Just as the bracero program was relied upon in certain sectors,
certain groups of growers have begun to rely heavily on the amendments
to the H-2A program that growers desire even though Congress has not
adopted them. In 1996, growers contracted only about 15,000 H-2A
workers.' 3 But, by 1999 the use of H-2A workers nearly tripled to about
42,000 workers.2 4 This increase is mostly attributable to the recent
attraction of southern growers-in North Carolina, Georgia and
Kentucky-to the program.' 2s North Carolina growers alone employed
over 10,000 of the guest workers contracted in 1999.26 Once a group of
growers begins applying for H-2A workers, they tend to adopt illegal
practices to make it easier to ensure continued access to guest workers.
They may drive away domestic workers by flatly refusing domestic
applicants,'8 by pretending they have no housing for the families of

119. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.102 (stating the contents of job offers); 20 C.F.R. § 655.103
(providing assurances). These substantive guarantees are discussed in more detail within this
Article.
120. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.103(e).
121. See CRS REP., supra note 2, at 1 (explaining how the 1999 Senate bill was introduced to
substantially change the H-2A program); Goldstein, Press Release, supra note 2; Fagan,
Compromise, supra note 2 (providing background about visa legislation in House of
Representatives in 2000); Fagan, Contentious, supra note 2; Bart Jansen, Deal Sought on Illegal
Fan Labor, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2000, at A25; Doyle, supra note 2, at A25. In September 2000,
the Labor Department did respond to grower requests and relaxed some of its H-2A regulations,
reducing fees paid by growers and giving growers the power to unilaterally extend their stated
employment season for a two week period. See Goldstein, Press Release, supra note 2.
122. See Susan Ferriss, Legal Guest-Worker Plan for Mexicans to Be Pushed, Cox NEWS
SERV., Jan. 11, 2001 [hereinafter Ferris, Legal].
123. See GAO Report, supra note 8, at 4.
124. See Ferriss, Mexico's, supra note 4; Jansen, supranote 121, at A25.
125. See Ferriss, Mexico's, supra note 4.
126. See HurMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 37 at 38.
127. See Hearing,supranote 2, at 48.
128. See id. at 48-49.
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domestic workers,1 29 or inventing performance tests that can be
manipulated to disqualify domestic applicants."0 "Failure to find homegrown employees usually is just a dodge," reported a journalist
investigating H-2A employers in 1998.3' Still, the Labor Department
approves 13the
importation of ninety-nine percent of the workers
2
requested.
Considering the bundle of substantive rights which H-2A workers
are granted upon entering an employment contract, this explosive growth
in the practice of employing H-2A workers is puzzling. As in the bracero
program, these fights are granted in order to implement the bedrock
principle of the H-2A program: that the use of guest workers will not
adversely affect domestic workers or work conditions. 33 These rights
include free transportation to and from the worksite, free housing during
employment, workers' compensation insurance, a guarantee of at least
three-fourths of the total amount of work offered in the job
announcement, and payment at the highest of three minimum wages: (1)
the federal or applicable state minimum wage; (2) the local, job-specific
"prevailing hourly wage;" or (3) the H-2A "adverse effect wage" or
AEWR.M The AEWR, usually the highest of the three measures, is the
"regional average hourly wage for nonsupervisory field and livestock
workers," as determined by the Labor Department.'35 For example, the
wage in North Carolina is $6.98 per hour and in Washington the par rate
is $7.64 per hour.'36 In 1999, a Kentucky grower reported that it
effectively cost him nine-dollars per hour for H-2A labor because he had
to provide free housing, transportation, and workers' compensation
insurance.' 3 ' In contrast, under AWPA, an ordinary farmworker is
guaranteed only whatever wage is promised (at least minimum wage if a

129. See Complaint for Plaintiff at 7-8, Beltran v. Georgia Growers Ass'n (S.D. Tex, 2000)
(M-00-093) (on file with the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal) (explaining how domestic
worker plaintiffs allege they were turned away by H-2A employer, who told them that there was no
family housing for them, despite statutory duty to make family housing available in the
circumstances); Azor v. Hepburn Orchards, Inc., No. 87-JSA-1 at 5 (Dep't of Labor Dec. 14, 1987)
("The unavailability of housing for non-working family members has a serious detrimental effect
upon the successful recruitment of domestic fruit pickers.").
130. See Dejean v. Fairview Orchards Assocs., Md. Job Serv. Complaint No. 4630-84-38,
(Apr. 29, 1986).
131. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 37, at 14-15.
132. See Goldstein, Press Release, supranote 2.
133. See 8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1)(B) (1994).

134. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(1), (2), (5), (6), (9) (2000).
135.
136.
137.

Goldstein, Press Release, supranote 2.
See id.
See Richard Smotherman, Editorial, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky), Apr. 26, 1999, at A6.
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statute applies),'33 whatever terms of housing are promised, and whatever
terms of transportation are promised.'39 In short, the H-2A worker must
be provided free housing, transportation and insurance, which others are
not entitled to, and the H-2A worker also tends to earn a higher hourly
wage.
If these substantive rights were enforced, an H-2A worker would
likely have few problems. He would be paid a fair wage, provided with a
substantial amount of work, and housed and transported for free in a safe
manner. If these substantive rights were enforced, the adverse effect on
domestic workers would be minimized since the employment of guest
workers would clearly be costing the grower more dollars per hour than
employment of domestic counterparts. If these substantive rights were
being enforced, no profit-minded grower would jump through
bureaucratic hoops to hire H-2A workers when fifty-six percent of
farmworkers in the United States were idle at the peak of the season."'
Yet curiously, the number of H-2A workers has nearly tripled in the last
three years.'42
The foregoing sketch of the historical evolution of the low-wage
farmworker suggests an explanation to this conundrum: that H-2A
workers-like their forerunners, the slaves, sharecroppers, migrants
restricted by pass systems, day laborers compelled by vagrancy laws,
workers chased away at the point of a shotgun, and braceros-are
exceptionally vulnerable and therefore, exceptionally desirable. In the
following section, this Article reveals how federal statutes and
' 14
regulations-despite quixotic promises to cause "no adverse effect 1_
have been written in a manner which deliberately renders H-2A workers
more vulnerable than domestic workers and even, at least in some
respects, more vulnerable than undocumented workers. There is nothing
138. The federal Fair Labor Standards Act, which provides minimum wage coverage for field
workers, does not apply to, among others: "local hand harvest laborers," 29 C.F.R. §§ 516.33(d),
780.310-780.315, 780.319 (2000), or "nonlocal minor" workers who are working at a piece rate, 29
C.F.R. §§ 516.33(e), 780.318-780.320.
139. See 29 U.S.C. § 1832(c) (1994).
140. Federal health and safety standards govern the transportation and housing of all H-2A
workers. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.102(b)(1), (b)(5) (2000).
141. Indeed, even assuming that fifty percent of the workers in the United States are
undocumented, there still remains a large number of domestic workers who are employable. See
Goldstein, Press Release, supra note 2.
142. See GAO Report, supranote 8, at 50.
143. This promise is quixotic because it seems an impossible goal. It would seem that the
importation of any guest workers whatsoever would adversely affect domestic workers or working
conditions, since it would prevent the market price of farm labor from rising according to the
domestic supply and demand of that labor.
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new under the sun: growers are once again seeking to employ only
persons who, due to handicapscreated by law, are so disadvantaged that
they have no choice but to continue working regardless the conditions of
employment.
III. RIGHTS WITHOUT A REMEDY: THE SOPHISTICATED WAY TO
SANCTION LABOR ABUSES

Jeremy Bentham referred to human rights as "nonsense on stilts"
because it is nonsense to call a moral ideal a "right" when no
institutional apparatus exists to enforce it. 4 Such rights are hobbled
because they have no purchase in a particular jurisdiction and because
they have no firm connection to an adjudicatory process that would
enable them to become a reality here on earth.
If the H-2A program's substantive rights for H-2A workers are not
quite as tenuous as "nonsense on stilts," then they are at least nonsense
seriously hobbled. This Section discusses the disjunction between H-2A
workers' substantive rights and the process of adjudication. Basically,
H-2A workers only have a remote possibility of protecting their
employment rights because they have no connection to effective
institutions to enforce those rights. There are two aspects to this
disconnection. First, the material conditions of their employment render
H-2A workers inherently vulnerable. Second, federal statutes,
regulations and case law, rather than compensating for this exceptional
vulnerability, aggravate it by largely excluding H-2A workers from the
judicial system.
A. The UnfavorableMaterialConditions of Employmentfor H-2A
Workers
H-2A workers essentially share with braceros their condition of
living in isolation. H-2A workers travel far from home to live
temporarily in a foreign community-usually a rural county where
agriculture is king.14'5 At best, these communities tend to ignore the
temporary workers in their midst and at worst, they subject them to

144. See Parker R. Conrad, Harvard U.: Harvard Law Celebrates 15th Anniversary of Human

Rights Program, U-WIRE, Sept. 21, 1999, available at 1999 WL 18814283 (discussing the
significance of Bentham's phrase); Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianismand
Punishmentof the Innocent, 32 ROTGERs L.J. 115, 182-83 (2000).
145. See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369,372 (N.J. 1971).
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violent abuse. 146 The H-2A workers do not know of the social services
possibly available to them, and they lack the English skills often
required to gain assistance.141 Therefore, they must rely on their
employer for any contact with the outside world. 148 More so than other

generally live in a world apart from the
migrant workers, H-2A workers
4

communities they work in. 1
Unlike any other farmworker in the United States, an H-2A worker
is tied to a single employer. An H-2A worker is not authorized to work
for any employer except the one whose contract allowed the worker to
gain temporary admission to the United States. 5 ° If the work is
insufficient,'' the employer is abusive, 5 2 or the housing is intolerable,
the H-2A worker does not have the option of finding another job during
the remainder of the work visa; his only option is to tolerate it or quit

and return immediately to his native country.'

In this respect, H-2A

workers are significantly more vulnerable than undocumented
workers.'9
H-2A workers are also especially vulnerable because they have had
146. See Charlie LeDuff, Immigrant Workers Tell of Being Lured and Beaten, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 20,2000, atB1.
147. See ROTHENBERG, HANDS, supra note 13, at 215; Kimberly Hefling, Migrants, Farmers,
Learn Language, Assoc. PRESS, Dec. 4, 2000, available at 2000 WL 30318173 (explaining that for
those migrants who do not know English, "even simple tasks such as shopping can be difficult").
148. See Shack, 277 A.2d at 372-73.
149. See id. at 372 ("The migrant farmworkers are a community within but apart from the local
scene. They are rootless and isolated."); ROTHENBERG, HANDS, supra note 13, at 28 (one migrant
worker explains: "As a migrant, you find yourself living in a different, uncomfortable world.
Because of this, you suffer"); Hefling, supranote 148, at 2000 WL 30318173.
150. See Hearing,supranote 2, at 53; HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supranote 37, at 38.
151. One of the primary complaints of farmworkers is that they are not getting enough work.
Usually, when they do complain, they complain about being cheated out of wages or not being
given enough work, rather than complaining about the abusive treatment or squalid housing that
they had to endure at the same time. The problem of too-little work is a serious one for a
farmworker. This lack may force the worker to go into further debt while sitting idle and causing the
worker to miss his infrequent opportunity to earn the money, he and his family need to survive on
all year. Meanwhile, growers err on the side of employing too many workers, because it gives them
the security of knowing the crop will be picked as rapidly as possible and gives them leverage
against the workers to force them to accept his unfavorable modifications to the terms of
employment. See generally,HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 37.
152. See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, Farm Union Takes Aim at a Big Pickle Maker, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 2000, at A22 (stating that a union organizer reported seeing a grower belt-whip an H-2A
guest worker who was allegedly working too slow).
153. See id.
154. See, e.g., New York's Harvest of Shame, DAILY NEws (N.Y.), Aug. 1, 1999, at 40
("Foreigners who come legally are exploited even more than the illegals."). Notably, the regulations
did not have to create this unique vulnerability. Federal law could easily have avoided this situation
by granting the H-2A worker the right to take other agricultural employment as long as he registers
this employment with the Labor Department.
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to make significant capital investments merely for the chance to work in
the United States. During the bracero program the federal government
took responsibility for the applicant selection process, 53 but today the
government leaves the H-2A recruitment process in the hands of private
agents and Mexican officials. In order to get selected for an H-2A visa, a

Mexican worker typically needs to pay fees or bribes to various
recruiters and government officials along the way.

56 Since

these workers

usually have no savings, they incur debts in order to make these

payments.'57 Therefore, in the initial months of their employment, most
I--2A workers are laboring to pay off a debt.'58 This prevents them from
doing anything that risks losing their jobs.'59 Again, this element makes
H-2A workers more vulnerable than other farmworkers in the United
States."

Given their inherent vulnerability, it is especially difficult for an H2A worker to voice complaints about his treatment. Reports have shown
that swift retaliation is common against migrant farmworkers in general
and against H-2A workers in particular who dare to complain about
abuses.' 61 In addition, an H-2A worker who complains is likely to be
blacklisted by employers and by recruitment services operating in
Mexico. 6 2 In 1999, a Carnegie Endowment study determined that the
blacklisting of H-2A workers "'appears to be widespread, is highly
organized, and occurs at all stages of the recruitment and employment
155. See United States v. Ward, 309 F.2d 640, 641 & n.3-643 (5th Cir. 1962).
156. See Schrader, supra note 115, at Al (describing H-2A workers' reliance on loans to
participate in H-2A program); McCaffery, supra note 17, at Al (reporting about the illegal charges
H-2A workers must pay for the opportunity to work in the United States); see also WILLIAM
MADSEN, MEXICAN-AMERICANS OF SOUTH TEXAS 28 (1964) (describing similar experiences for
braceros).
157. See McCaffery, supranote 17, at Al.
158. See id.
159. See AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY 28 (Dover Publications 1958) (1911)
(defining debt as "[ain ingenious substitute for the chain and whip of the slave-driver").
160. While the other workers usually had to invest in their own transportation to the work site,
they did not have to pay fees and bribes to recruiters and officials. Again, federal law could have
avoided this added burden on H-2A workers by controlling the recruitment process, or at the least,
by calculating the prevailing wage owed to H-2A workers to cover these unique expenses.
161. See Beliz v. W.H. McLeod & Sons Packing Co., 765 F.2d 1317, 1332 & n.73 (5th Cir.
1985) (citing legislative history and recognizing that the crucial purpose of such anti-retaliation
clauses is to help farm workers "overcome a general background of fear and intimidation caused by
the widespread practice of retaliation against those who complain about violations"); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 37, at 11; ROTHENBERG, HANDS, supra note 13, at 43, 55-56; Patifio,
supra note 16, at 48-49; Glascock, supra note 5, at IA; Sengupta, supra note 153, at A22; see
generallyNew York's Harvest, supranote 154, at 40 (comparing legal H-2A workers to indentured
servants).
162. See Patifio, supra note 16, at 49.
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process."" 63
In 2000, Human Rights Watch investigated the employment of H2A workers in North Carolina, where almost one quarter of all H-2A
workers now labor.' ' Its report vividly shows the conditions of fear and
intimidation under which H-2A workers are currently forced to live.' 65
Human Rights Watch documented the North Carolina employers
engaging in the following practices: (1) leading H-2A workers in "a
ritual akin to book- burning by making them collectively trash 'Know
Your Rights' manuals from Legal Services attorneys[;]"' 66 (2)
conditioning the occupancy of housing on the waiver of the basic right
to receive visitors at that housing; 67 and (3) using the local sheriff to
drive away Legal Services advocates responding to calls from H-2A
workers.'9 In a private moment, an H-2A worker told the Human Rights
Watch investigator: "'They don't let us talk to Legal Services or the
union .... 'They would fire us if we called them or talked to them."" 69
In sum, H-2A workers are not in a position to voice complaints
about their conditions of employment. There are many practical barriers
to their expression of any complaint such as isolation from the local
community, the unique dependence on the singular employer, the need
to pay debts incurred in order to work, and the palpable fear of
retaliation and blacklisting. Moreover, growers even take affirmative
steps to bar an H-2A worker's access to the legal services providers who
are essentially the H-2A workers' only non-governmental ally in the
country.
B. How FederalLaw and Regulations PreventH-2A Workersfrom
Enforcing Their Substantive Rights
The practice of using the local sheriff to chase off legal aid
advocates is a contemporary replay of the "shotgun settlement" in which
growers would pull out a shotgun (or get the sheriff to pull one out) to
chase off workers who complained about being cheated out of wages.
163. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 37, at 159. See Mexican Migrants on the Chicken
Trail, 3 MIGRATION NEWS, Dec. 1996, available at http://migration.ucdavis.edu//MNArchive/dee_1996-03.html (last visited May 11, 2000).
164. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supranote 37, at 146, 148.
165. Notably, Human Rights Watch states that the stories they recount in their report were
chosen because they are typical, not because they are exceptional. See id. at 71.
166. Id.at 148.
167. See id. at 147.
168. See id. at 155.
169. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supranote 33, at 156.
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The main difference in these tactics is that the wanton use of force is
now being applied when a worker tries to gain access to the institutional
apparatus where he could enforce his rights, rather than at the point
where the worker is actually trying to enforce his substantive rights.
Formerly, there -were "substantive shotgun settlements," now there are
procedural ones.'7°
Congress, the Labor Department, and federal courts have helped to
avoid such "procedural shotgun settlements" by largely obviating the
growers' need to cut off an H-2A worker's access to judicial or
administrative relief by cutting H-2A workers off from the realistic
chance of gaining relief through administrative or judicial bodies
themselves. Rather than addressing the unique vulnerability of H-2A
workers, federal law has further weakened this class of workers by
denying them the procedural rights enjoyed by their domestic
counterparts. As explained herein, federal law provides H-2A workers
with a patently inadequate administrative remedy, virtually bars them
from federal court, and banishes them to unpredictable treatment in an
inconvenient and often biased state court venue.
1. The Administrative Remedy Created and Administered by the Labor
Department is Inadequate
The Department of Labor has issued various regulations governing
the practice of obtaining and employing H-2A workers.' 7 ' These
regulations include provisions giving the Labor Department the ability to
or
resolve certain foreseeable complaints-from either
7 2 growers
workers-in the course of certification and employment.
In particular, the Labor Department has issued regulations
governing investigations into alleged violations of H-2A employment

170. This is not to say that the old style shotgun settlement tactics are no longer employed.
Legal Aid advocates still receive complaints where the grower has called on the local law
enforcement officers to force workers to accept paychecks, which are allegedly insufficient. See
Arrest Made in Farm Worker Shooting, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 18, 2000 (commenting on the
Colorado farmer who was arrested on suspicion of shooting and wounding migrant farmworkers
that allegedly caused a disturbance at a labor camp); Estes Thompson & Michael Melia, Mexican
Worker Wins Labor ComplaintAgainst N.C. Grower, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 19, 2000, available
at http://web2.westlaw.com/result/tex. .. service=Search&ss=Doc&Tab=Cite+List (last visited Feb.
21, 2001) (reporting that an employer was sued for physically assaulting a worker who made a
complaint about working conditions).
171. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 652.1-652.9, 655.90-655.113 (2000); 29 C.F.R. §§ 501.0501.7(2000).
172. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 501.15-501.47 (2000).
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contracts. 73 These regulations do not create specific procedures for

initiating or investigating such a complaint. The regulations allow that:
"[a]ny person may report a violation of the work contract obligations" to

the Labor Department.' 74 Meanwhile, the Labor Department, "pursuant
to a complaint or otherwise," can investigate suspected violations "as

may be [deemed] appropriate" by the Secretary. 7 ' If it so desires, the
Department can enforce the regulations by imposing the denial of a labor
certificate to the grower, instituting administrative proceedings to

enforce contractual obligations, assessing a civil monetary penalty, or
petitioning a federal district court for injunctive relief or specific

performance.176 Thus, the regulations create a very loose procedure.
Basically, if an H-2A worker complains in some unspecified manner, the
Labor Department may take whatever investigative or enforcement

action it deems appropriate, if any at all.
This set of regulations is mostly remarkable for what it lacks. There
are no time tables or deadlines applicable to the Labor Department's
action upon receipt of a complaint. In fact, the Labor Department has

neither an obligation to institute proceedings in response to a
complaint, 7 nor must it notify the complainant that it has taken action or
has declined to take action in response to the complaint. Therefore, if an
H-2A worker complains to the Labor Department, he has no grounds to

demand so much as a reply from it. Rather, the worker must wait
indefinitely for a response that may never come. '
According to U.S. Supreme Court case law, such an administrative
complaint "system" is inadequate. In Coit Independence Joint Venture v.
Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp.,' the Supreme Court, in
173. See 29 C.F.R. § 501.16-501.22. These regulations are issued pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1188(g)(2) (1994), which authorizes the Secretary of Labor to enforce H-2A employment contracts.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1188(g)(2).
174. See 29 C.F.R. § 501.5(d).
175. See 29 C.F.R. § 501.5(a).
176. See 29 C.F.R. § 501.16(a)-(d).
177. See 29 C.F.R. § 501.16 ("Whenever the Secretary believes that the H-2A provisions of the
INA or these regulations have been violated such action shall be taken and such proceedings
instituted as deemed appropriate....")(emphasis added).
178. This situation is reminiscent of one of Franz Kafka's absurdist parables. In Before the
Law, Kafka's protagonist comes from the country in order to stand before the door where he is to
pray for admittance to the Law. See FRANZ KAFKA, Before the Law, in THE PENAL COLONY 148
(Willa Muir & Edwin Muir Trans., 1948). There he waits until he dies. See id. at 148-49. As he
passes away, the Law's doorkeeper tells him that this door was created especially for him. See id. at
150. In this parable, due process is turned on its head: legal procedures are not designed to ensure
equal treatment for all persons, rather, they feature special provisions which deliberately deny
adequate treatment to particular persons.
179. 489 U.S. 561 (1989).
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deciding whether a plaintiff had to exhaust all possible administrative
remedies before filing suit in court, analyzed the administrative
complaint system created by the FSLIC for handling certain claims
regarding the ownership of funds within the FSLIC's possession.' 0 The
applicable regulations allowed the FSLIC to indefinitely defer making a
decision on such claims, as long as the FSLIC periodically informed the
complainant that action on the claim was being deferred.' 8 ' As the Court
explained, "the regulations do not place a clear and reasonable time limit
on FSLIC's consideration of whether to pay, settle, or disallow
claims..... [N]o time limit is established for FSLIC's consideration of
those claims retained for further review. 182 The Court criticized such a
Kafkaesque administrative remedy as being akin to a "'black hole,"'
concluding that "[t]he lack of a reasonable time limit in the current
administrative claims procedure renders it inadequate."'83 Consequently,
the Court determined that the plaintiff acted properly in filing suit
without first
exhausting the potentially interminable administrative
4
remedy.'1
It should be recognized that the Court in Coit Independence
declared the potentially interminable administrative remedy to be
categorically "inadequate" in the context of deciding whether that
administrative remedy had to be exhausted prior to resorting to the
courts for relief." In other words, Coit Independence did not prohibit
agencies from creating such "black hole" administrative remedies.
Nevertheless, the decision espouses the principle that it is fundamentally
unfair to force a complainant to wait indefinitely for an administrative
agency to act on a complaint. Although administrative remedies
requiring a relatively long wait have been found to be "adequate" in this
same context, the Supreme Court found that the FSLIC remedy was
inadequate due to the uncertainty of the length of delay.8 6 Other courts
have followed suit in the context of the Privacy Act (which required
180. See id. at 586-87.
181. See id. After this ruling, Congress promptly enacted the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA") which created an administrative remedy
consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Resohtion Tnhst Corp. v. WW Dev. & Mgmt., 73
F.3d 1298, 1306-07 (3rd Cir. 1996).
182. Coit,489 U.S. at 586.
183. Id. at 586, 587.
184. See id. at 586-87. Following Colt, the Privacy Act's administrative remedy for correcting
errors in personal records has been criticized as inadequate for the same reason. See Schaeuble v.
Reno, 87 F. Supp. 2d 383, 388-90 (D.N.J. 2000). The Privacy Act requires the agency to make a
"prompt[]" response to complaints. Id. at 389.
185. See Coit, 489 U.S. at 587.
186. See id.
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merely a "prompt[ ]" reply to a complaint) and state law administrative
remedies as well. 7 The message is that a remedy subject to endless
deferral is insufficient.
Basically, the Labor Department has created a "black hole" variety
administrative complaint system for handling H-2A workers' complaints
against growers. Unlike the FSLIC system, the H-2A system does not
even require the agency to notify the complainant of the status of the
complaint. Unlike the Privacy Act system, the H-2A system says
absolutely nothing about when or in what manner the agency must act.
Therefore, the H-2A remedy appears to be the blackest of the black hole
remedies created by federal agencies to date. Clearly, this type of
administrative procedure does not give the kinds of guarantees that
inspire reliance.
Furthermore, a broader review of the H-2A regulations suggests

that the creation of an inadequate remedy for workers' complaints
reflects not mere carelessness on the Labor Department's part, but rather

an institutional bias in favor of growers. While this "black hole" is the
only remedy that the Labor Department has created for workers, the
Department provides a host of rapid-response remedies for growers.
For example, the Labor Department's regulations provide an instant
remedy for growers when they suspect that domestic workers are
abusing the fifty percent guarantee'88 by intentionally withholding their
applications until after the H-2A workers are already at work.'8 9 In this
way, farmworker unions or organizations could turn the fifty percent
guarantee safeguard into a tool for undermining the H-2A program,
forcing growers to discharge the H-2A workers and causing the grower
to incur additional expense for having tried to employ guest workers.
The regulations create an expeditious, elaborate remedy to address
this rather extraordinary eventuality.'" Of course, the ordinary complaint
187. See Schaeuble, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 389; see Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Hawkins, No. 97IA-01214-SCT, 1999 LEXIS 337, at *18-20, 23 (Miss. Oct. 28, 1999).
188. Basically, even after the H-2A workers have begun the farm work, the employer must
ensure the preference for domestic workers by hiring any domestic worker who applies for the farm
work during the first fifty percent of the H-2A employment season. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.103(e)
(2000).
189. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.106(g) (2000).
190. There are no reported cases involving such circumstances. Allegations such as this made
by a grower were investigated and determined to be groundless by the Labor Department. See Vega
v. Nourse Farms, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 334, 339-40 (D. Mass. 1999). In Vega, an H-2A employer
failed to hire certain U.S. citizen workers at the very start of the season after already offering jobs to
those workers. See id. at 338-39. When the U.S. workers complained, the grower alleged that the
workers were intentionally withheld. See id. at 339, 345. The Labor Department found the grower's
allegations without merit. See id. at 339-40. Even after investigating the workers' complaints and
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system under 29 U.S.C. § 501 provides a remedy to the grower in such
circumstances: the grower could complain to the Labor Department
pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 501.5(d) and wait indefinitely for a resolution. 9 '
But due to the special administrative remedy, growers need not resort to
the "black hole" remedy in these circumstances. If a U.S. worker applies
for work and the grower suspects such a withholding-of-labor scheme is
afoot, the grower can make a complaint to the Labor Department
pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 655.106(g).'" Within five working days of
receiving the complaint, the Department's local agents must complete an
investigation that must include, at a minimum, interviews of the grower,
the worker, and any suspected union or group involved in the alleged
scheme.9 Then, within thirty-six working hours of receiving the initial
investigation, the Labor Department must issue a final decision on the
issue.' 94 There is no reciprocal remedial scheme for a U.S. worker when
an H-2A employer rejects U.S. workers who apply for jobs held by H2A workers.1 95
Similarly, the regulations create a rapid administrative remedy that
a grower can use in the event that the Labor Department denies an
application for permission to import H-2A workers.'96 An employer
whose application has been denied can choose to get an administrative
law judge's decision on his application based either upon a review of the
written record or upon a de novo hearing.'97 If the grower opts for the
ruling on a~written record, the Labor Department must issue the decision
finding the grower in violation of the regulations, the Labor Department declined to sanction the

grower. See id.
191.

See 29 C.F.R. § 501.5(d) (2000). Presumably, the grower could also sue the workers for

intentional tortious interference with contractual relations.
192. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.106(g).
193. See id. § 655.106(g)(2)-(3). In contrast, the ordinary administrative remedies for
violations of the H-2A obligations impose no specific requirement on the steps to be taken in an
investigation.
194. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.106(g)(4). It could be assumed that this special remedy was created
for the benefit of H-2A workers. However, that assumption would not comport with the long string
of cases that indicate that H-2A regulations were not passed to benefit H-2A workers. See infra note
221 and accompanying text. Thus, the only reasonable assumption is that this special remedy was
created to protect the interests of the H-2A employers.

195. See Donaldson v. United States Dep't of Labor, 930 F.2d 339, 348 (4th Cir. 1991) ("lit is
obvious that this administrative complaint procedure does not provide the remedies that would be

available under a private right of action."). In fact, the U.S. worker is not entitled to adequate relief
by making an administrative complaint. The only penalties available against a grower who has

rejected qualified U.S. workers in favor of H-2A workers is to bar the grower from future
participation in the H-2A program. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.210(a), 658.501(c), 658.503,
658.504(a)(2)(ii) (2000).
196. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.112 (2000).
197. See id. § 655.112(a)-(b).
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within five working days of receipt of the complaint.' If'the grower opts
for the hearing, the hearing must be held within five working days of
receipt and a decision must be issued no later than ten days after the
'nearing.'" The ALJ's decision "shall specify the reasons for the action
taken and shall be immediately provided to the employer.''°
Finally, the "black hole" complaint procedure itself provides
detailed rules allowing for the appeal of any action taken by the Labor
Department-such as ordering a grower to pay workers' wages due or
fining a grower for substandard housing or transportation practicesY,' If
requested, a hearing with the ALJ must be held within sixty days of the
complaint, and the ALJ's decision must be rendered sixty days
thereafter.m The Secretary of Labor must review this decision within
ninety days if a review is sought, and then this final decision is subject to
review by the federal courts."3 This extensive and prompt system of
review and appeal was created exclusively to protect growers, since it is
extremely unlikely that the Department will ever impose an
administrative penalty on an H-2A worker.'
In sum, the Labor Department's regulations do not treat H-2A
workers nearly as well as their employers. Under these regulations, an
aggrieved grower has the right to a reasoned decision from the ALJ
within a definite, and frequently very brief, time period. In contrast, an
aggrieved H-2A worker is free to make a complaint to the Labor
Department, but is not even entitled to a report on the status of that
complaint.
The disparity between the formal treatment of growers and workers
under the H-2A regulations is symptomatic of the Labor Department's
historical bias in managing guest worker programs. 0 As Galarza
concluded in his study of the bracero program, growers dominated the
Department's policy setting, using the Department essentially as their

198. See id. § 655.112(a)(2); see also Ariz. Farmworkers Union v. Buhl, 747 F.2d 1269, 1271-

72 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that there is no need to give labor union parties with interest in such a
dispute the opportunity to participate in this review).

199. See 20 C.F.R § 655.112(b)(ii)-(iii).
200. Id. § 655.112(a)(2).
201. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 501.30-501.47 (2000).
202. See id. §§ 501.38,501.41(a).

203. See id. §§ 501.45, 501.47.
204. See, e.g., New York's Harvest, supra note 154, at 40 ("Like everything the government
does in agriculture, the H-2A program favors the farmers, all in the name of supporting the family
farm. Indeed, a spokesman for the state Agriculture Department admits that the agency exists partly
to 'defend farmers' against allegations of worker exploitation.").

205. See, e.g., id.
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As such, the "merchants of labor [i.e. the

Labor Department] could not be disciplinarians [of the growers] as
well."m
There is no reason to believe that the taint of this historical bias has
been purged from the H-2A program. The basic contours of the current
H-2A provisions were established during the bracero era. Also, as will

be explained below, federal courts looking at the H-2A program have
concluded that the H-2A provisions were not even created with the
intent to benefit H-2A workers, but rather solely with the intent to
protect domestic workers. Furthermore, even if today's Labor
Department is staffed with personnel intent on protecting workers'
rights, it has far too few employees to begin to provide H-2A workers
the protections they need." Since the Department requires many
resources to fulfill its role of protecting farmworkers, 9 yet needs few
resources to approve growers' labor certificates and to place a seal of
approval on growers' actions, an understaffed Labor Department is de
facto a Labor Department with a pro-grower bias.210 As recently as 1993,
the Helsinki Commission recommended the abolishment of the H-2A
program in light of the Labor Department's failure to enforce H-2A
workers' rights.21 In sum, H-2A workers can hope for little
administrative relief when an understaffed Labor Department 2continues
1
to implement regulations with built-in preferences for growers.
206. See GALARZA, supranote 58, at 121-28.
207. Id. at 169.
208. See Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332, 342 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting
that the allegation of amicus curiae show the federal agencies' efforts to protect farmworkers have
decreased in recent years); Hearing,supra note 2, at 43 (describing that from 1985 to 1995, the
Labor Department's number of investigation of farmworker violations dropped by fifty percent);
ROTHENBERG, HANDS, supra note 13, at 216 (discussing that to ensure compliance in the
employment of the farmworkers in America, the Department only uses the functional equivalent of
27 full-time employees); New York's Harvest,supranote 154, at 40 (reporting shortage of bilingual
officials capable of communicating with farmworkers); Schrader, supra note 115, at Al (noting that
"enforcement of H-2A's safeguards has become lax").
209. The tasks of inspecting housing, transportation and labor conditions is inherently a laborintensive proposition. See, e.g., HAHAMOVrrTCH, supra note 51, at 203 (describing the federal
Migratory Camp Program) ("[Tlhere will never be enough federal and local officials to investigate
housing conditions on every farm or check every worker's pay stub to see if the proper piece rate
has been paid.").
210. Notably, the Bush Administration proposed cutting the DOL's budget by five percent in
fiscal year of 2001.
211. See Hearing,supra note 2, at 46.
212. Even when the Labor Department does take enforcement action, it is sometimes wholly
inadequate. For example, after one worker was hospitalized, a Colorado sheep rancher was accused
of starving, beating and withholding pay from his H-2A workers. See Deborah Frazier, Abuse Case
Settled Against Ranch Family, No Fine Is Imposed in Alleged Assaults Against Sheepherders,
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2. Federal Law and Decisions Have Virtually Shut the Doors of the
Federal Courthouse to H-2A Workers
Given that the administrative remedy is inadequate under Coit
Independence, an H-2A worker (who manages to find legal
representation) 2 3 can directly seek relief in the courts. However, an H2A worker-uniike every other farmworker in the United Statesshould not necessarily plan on going to federal court with his grievance.
Action by Congress and the federal courts has to a great extent deprived
H-2A workers of the ability to avail themselves of the federal forum.
Here, too, the federal government fails the H-2A workers whose very
presence in the country it authorizes, facilitates, and supervises.
Domestic and undocumented workers may sue their employers in
federal court under AWPA, the federal statute designed especially to
protect migrant farmworkers. 21 4 But the AWPA explicitly excludes H-2A
workers from its coverage. 25' Because AWPA provides migrant
farmworkers with some valuable procedural advantages to compensate
for the special difficulties faced by migrants in bringing suit, the
consequences of this exclusion are substantial. Their difficulties arise
because farmworkers tend to travel far from their homes to work in
places where they are isolated from the community, are especially6
vulnerable to retaliation, and lack adequate access to legal services.1'
Therefore, it is crucial that, in practice, AWPA allows a farmworker to
maintain suit in a federal district court at the place of recruitment, which
is usually relatively near the worker's home.1 7
available at http:/www.rockymountainnews.com/drmnlstatelarticle/0,1299,DRMN_2l354783,
00.html. Rather, the Labor Department merely required the rancher to write a handbook on how he
will treat foreign workers in the future. See id. Even if a fine is ultimately imposed by the Labor
Department, it will likely have little effect as a deterrent. See Glascock, supra note 6, at 1A
(reporting that a grower found to have failed to pay over $100,000 in back wages was fined just
$650 for that failure).
213. See infra Part II.B.4.
214. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 1854(a) (1994); Escobar v. Baker, 814 F. Supp.
1491, 1498 (W.D. Wash. 1993) (finding that undocumented workers are covered by AWPA). See,
e.g., Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 641 F. Supp. 259, 261 (D. Ariz. 1986)
(reporting a suit on behalf of undocumented workers).
215. See 29 U.S.C. § 1802(8)(B)(ii) (1994).
216. See Aguero v. Christopher, 481 F. Supp. 1272, 1275 (S.D. Tex. 1980) ("It is well known
that many migrant laborers do not have the financial resources necessary to prosecute a claim
hundreds of miles from home.").
217. This right works as follows. A grower, or his or her agents will usually make some
representations to farmworkers in the area where they live regarding the terms and conditions of the
seasonal agricultural employment that the grower is offering. AWPA requires that these
representations take a certain form and not be "false or misleading." 29 U.S.C. §§ 1821(f), 1831(e)

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

31

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 9
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 18:575

Thus, AWPA gives all farmworkers a ticket into federal court and

allows many of them the advantage of filing suit in their home district.
By being excluded from AWPA, H-2A workers are denied these

rights.218 In light of this denial, advocates have sought other means of
gaining federal court jurisdiction-some successful, some not.
The most direct approach to federal court has been to assert that H-

2A workers have an implied right of action to enforce those provisions
of federal law which establish the H-2A program and impose its minimal
conditions of employment.29 .However, courts applying the test under
Cort v. Ash,= have declined to find such an implied right of action for
H-2A workers, based partly on the rationale that the H-2A statute and
regulations

were

not

"intended

to

especially

benefit

alien

workers... [but,] rather, their stated purpose is to protect the jobs of
United States citizens."'

Under this view, H-2A workers hold specific substantive rights
required by the H-2A statute, yet are not the intended beneficiaries of

those rights. According to the courts, they have these rights solely for
the benefit of domestic workers, acting essentially as trustees for their
domestic counterparts. H-2A workers are entitled to 100 square feet of
(1994). The farmworker then travels to perform the work promised. If during employment, the
recruitment promises are not fulfilled, which is a violation of AWPA, when the farmworker returns
home, the worker can seek legal representation and file suit in that venue. Section 1854(a) of
AWPA provides that venue is "coextensive with personal jurisdiction." Stewart v. Woods, 730 F.
Supp. 1096, 1097 (M.D. Fla. 1990). Personal jurisdiction is proper where recruitment took place
because that activity ordinarily gives rise to personal jurisdiction under the minimum contacts test.
See, e.g., Neizil v. Williams, 543 F. Supp. 899, 904 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Garcia v. Vasquez, 524 F.
Supp.2d 40, 42 (S.D. Tex. 1981); see also Burger King Corp v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-76
(1985). Thus, an aggrieved farmworker may return home, seek out legal assistance in the safety of
the local community, and maintain his suit in a forum free of the biases that can plague judges and
juries in the agricultural regions in which they work.
218. Of course, a Mexican H-2A worker could never bring suit in his home district. However,
such a worker could gain personal jurisdiction, and consequently establish proper venue as well, in a
border state such as Texas where the Mexican worker enters the United States, shows the grower's
agent that he is qualified to work under a visa in the United States, receives again the terms and
conditions of the employment offered, effectively enters the H-2A contract, and then accepts the
grower's free transportation to the work site in another state. This venue would be preferable to an
H-2A worker for the reasons described in the following subsection, and also due to the fact that this
may be the place where the worker finds legal representation on his return trip to Mexico.
219. These minimal conditions include the substantive rights granted to H-2A workers, such as
the right to be paid at least the "adverse effect wage rate," the right to at least three-fourths of the
hours of work promised, and the right to free, safe housing and transportation. 20 C.F.R. §§
655.102(b)(1), (5), (6), (9) (2000).
220. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).

221. Nieto-Santos v. Fletcher Farms, 743 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Lopez v.
Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F.2d 924, 924-26 (9th Cir. 1975); Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456
F.2d 890, 894-95 (10th Cir. 1972).
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living area in labor camp housing in order to benefit domestic workers2 2
H-2A workers are entitled to receive at least three-fourths of the work
projected because this entitlement will benefit domestic workers.= H-2A
workers get a free trip to work to benefit domestic workers. 2 4 This rather
strained reasoning has justified federal judges in keeping H-2A workers
out of their courts, and its currency goes a long way in explaining why
the Labor Department has not effectively protected H-2A workers'
substantive rights: the protection afforded to H-2A workers by these
rights was incidental, rather than intentional.
To date, H-2A workers' best chance at getting into federal court has
been to find an independent ground for federal jurisdiction.2 The most
likely ground is to allege a violation of the minimum wage guarantee
provided by the Fair Labor Standards Act that applies to most workers
within the United States, including alien workers.2 6 For example, it is
possible that improper deductions taken from H-2A workers' wages will
drive their wages below the minimum. Federal question jurisdiction also
exists where there are civil R.I.C.O. violations.2 7 Diversity jurisdiction is
possible as well, but will only exist if there are some unusual injuries,
since the value of the usual ordinary H-2A contract is far less than the
federal jurisdictional minimum of $75,00O0.
Thus, the Labor Department is not alone in turning a cold shoulder
to H-2A workers. Congress has done so deliberately by denying them
the tactical advantage of being able to sue under AWPA. And the federal
courts have also done so by denying H-2A workers an implied right of
action under the provisions of federal law granting H-2A workers certain
guarantees during their employment in the United States. At present, an
H-2A worker's most feasible route into federal court is to assert a cause
of action that serves as an independent ground for federal jurisdiction.

222. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(1)(i); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.142(b)(9) (1999).

223. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(6).
224. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(5).
225. Another, but relatively untested, direct approach to federal court is to assert that an H-2A
worker has a federal common law claim for breach of contract. See, e.g., Nieto-Santos, 743 F.2d at
642 (rejecting the workers' assertion of this argument).
226. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e), 206(a), (e) (1994).
227. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1994), Erwin Chemerinsky, Reporter's Draft for the Working
Group on Principles to Use When Considering the Federalizationof Civil Law, 46 HASTINGs L.J.
1305, 1309 (1995).
228. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Supp. IV 1998) (requiring $75,000 minimum amount in
controversy). See, e.g., Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., No. C-98-1462 MHP, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11343, at *5-9 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 1998) (stating that the general rule for determining jurisdictional
amount in controversy is to calculate the amount for each individual plaintiff, excluding punitive
damages).
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3. State Court Remedies Available to H-2A Workers are Inadequate
The federal government has largely abdicated responsibility for
protecting H-2A guest workers from the labor abuses they suffer in the
United States. Consequently, this task has fallen to the state court
system. State courts are H-2A workers' firmest legal foothold in the
country, but, at least in the eyes of farmworker advocates, that foothold
is far too unstable to be relied upon. As explained in this Section, while
it would be rash to assert that H-2A workers cannot get fair treatment in
any state court system, it should be recognized that Mexican guest
workers run a considerable risk of suffering biased treatment in many of
the state trial courts in the rural regions where they are likely to work.
Since biased treatment is a distinct possibility in many of these state
courts, the federal government should allow H-2A workers access to the
federal court system based on their status as seasonal farmworkers, just
as it grants that access to all other seasonal farmworkers.
The traditional justification for allowing federal jurisdiction in
diversity cases is to give an out-of-state litigant the ability to avoid the
risk of local bias in state court. 9 Since there is always complete
diversity between a foreign H-2A worker and his domestic employer,2'
this traditional justification for federal jurisdiction is relevant in every
H-2A lawsuit. The only reason that H-2A workers do not enjoy diversity
jurisdiction is that the amount in controversy in their suits is almost
always less than the jurisdictional minimum of $75,000.2" Nevertheless,
the relatively modest sums they do seek to recover (say roughly a
maximum of $10,000 for actual damages for the breach of a season's
contract) 232 are of great importance to plaintiffs who have gone into debt
to get the chance to work and whose total family income for a year is
normally less than $10,000.2 3 Presumably, having to run the risk of local
bias is at least as unfair for a Mexican guest worker seeking to recover
his annual wages as it is for an out-of-state insurance company
defending a $75,000 claim.
Some modem commentators have suggested that local bias is no

229. See Chemerinsky, supranote 230, at 1314.
230. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (stating diversity exists between
"citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state"). Of course the amount in controversy
must also be fulfilled. See id. § 1332(a).
231. See, e.g., Nieto-Santos, 743 F.2d at 640 (noting that the H-2A workers' claims did not
satisfy the jurisdictional minimum of the time that was $10,000).
232. Assuming a work season of about thirty weeks, for fifty hours per week at $7 per hour.
233. See NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS SURVEY, supra note 9, at 46.
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longer a significant danger in today's state court systems.TM However, a
1992 survey of practicing attorneys shows that the perception of bias
against non-local or out-of-state litigants remains widespread and
palpable.235 The 1992 study assumed that these apprehensions have some
basis in reality and concluded that local biases in state courts do exist
and remain "most prevalent in the more rural areas of the country,
including the Southern and lower Midwest States." 6 While almost all of
the surveyed attorneys opined that federal judges were generally more
competent than state judges, those attorneys who reported a specific
concern with local bias also tended to report that this perceived
superiority affected their filing decisions. 237 The moral is that, especially
in rural areas of the Southern and lower Midwestern states, attorneys
react to the stronger likelihood of local bias by seeking out the presumed
superior competency of the federal bench.
The very nature of H-2A workers' employment entails that they
will be employed in rural, agricultural regions. And, in fiscal year 2000,
over sixty percent of H-2A workers were employed in Southern states.3 s
Thus, it is a fact that H-2A workers are generally forced to resort to the
rural, Southern state trial courts where local bias is widely perceived to
be a significant factor in litigation. 239 In light of the findings of the 1992
study, it should be expected that H-2A workers will be hamstrung by
local bias in those state courts.
This presumption of an unfavorable bias against these out-of-state
workers is fortified by the fact that H-2A workers have absolutely no
political weight in the United States, are cultural and ethnic foreigners,
and usually challenge powerful local interests when filing suit. By
offering discrete and insular minorities access to federal courts, it is
precisely this type of bias that federal civil rights statutes such as 42
U.S.C. § 1983 are designed to counterbalance. 40 In sum, although H-2A
234. See Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity
and FederalQuestion Jurisdiction,41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 426 (1992) (noting that the Federal
Court Study Committee rejected the importance of local bias for diversity jurisdiction).
235. See id. at 428.
236. Id. at 428. "[A]ttomeys in most Southern States and the less industrialized Midwest
reported ... [local] bias as affecting their forum filing decisions in high proportions." Id. at 410
(citation omitted).
237. See id. at 429,433-34.
238. See 2000 U.S. DEP'T LABOR H-2A REP. 8, 10.
239. See Miller, supranote 234, at 412.
240. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503 (1982); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452, 463-65 (1974); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
174, 193 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring); Chemerinsky, supra note 230, at 1309; Scott T. Schutte,
Note, How FarIs Too Far: Analyzing the CollateralLaw Applicable in State Court Section 1983
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workers as a class of litigants need federal protection from local state
court bias more than other out-of-state litigants and farmworkers, they
are generally denied access to federal court.

A recent H-2A case suggests just how important local bias appears
to be in such cases. In 1996, as Kentucky tobacco farmers began using a
significant number of H-2A workers, a crew of several Mexican H-2A
"'
workers arrived in Graves county to harvest tobacco and vegetables.24
The contracting grower allegedly prematurely terminated the

employment of many of the workers, forcing them to return to Mexico at
their own expense. 2

In August 1998, these H-2A workers, with the assistance of legal
services attorneys, sent a letter to the Kentucky grower explaining their
breach of contract claims and proposing settlement discussions. 43 Rather
than negotiating, the Kentucky grower filed suit against them in Graves

County Circuit Court for allegedly breaching their H-2A employment
contract in 1996.24 As the grower's attorney candidly told the press, the
suit was filed to pre-empt the possibility that the workers would file their
own suit in Texas.245
By filing this preemptive lawsuit, the grower ran the risk of

violating the H-2A regulations' anti-retaliation provision.

6

This risk

Litigation, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 875, 906-07 (1997) ("Section 1983 was enacted because 'neutral'
state courts were able to vindicate citizens' civil rights in theory but not in practice.").
241. See Brief for Appellant at 1, 3, Villegas-Alanis v. wurth, appealfiled,No. 00-50399 (5th
Cir. 2000).
242. See id. at 6-8.
243. See id. at 8.
244. See id. at 9. Inexplicably, a second grower in the region joined the employer as a plaintiff
in this suit, although the second grower had no contractual relationship with the H-2A workers. See
id.
245. See James Malone, Legal FightPromptsFarmersto Sue Migrant Workers First; Strategy
Aims to Keep the Case in Kentucky, COURIER-J., Aug. 20, 1999, at 5A. Notably, the H-2A workers
did file their own suit in Texas federal court, giving rise to an interjurisdictional struggle. See Brief
for Appellant at 10, Villegas-Alanis v. wurth, appealfiled,No. 00-50399 (5th Cir. 2000).
246. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.103(g), (g)(5) (2000). This section provides:
The employer shall not intimidate, threaten, restrain, coerce, blacklist, discharge, or in
any manner discriminate against, and shall not cause any person to intimidate, threaten,
restrain, coerce, blacklist, discharge, or in any manner discriminate against, any person
who has with just cause .... [e]xercised or asserted on behalf of himself/herself or
others any right or protection afforded by § 216 of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1186), or this
subpart or any other DOL regulation promulgated pursuant to § 216 of the INA.
Id. The act of filing a lawsuit against a former employee may constitute an act of unlawful
retaliation. See Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 157 (3rd Cir. 1999) (recognizing that
"Title VII prohibits retaliation against employees who engage in a protected activity"); Shafer v.
Dallas County Hosp. Dist., 76 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1555, 1560 (N.D. Tex. 1997) ("It is
well established that filing a retaliatory lawsuit may be actionable under Title VII,"); Urquiola v.
Linen Supermarket, Inc., No. 94-14-CIV-ORL-19, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9902, at *3 (M.D. Fla,
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was apparently worth it to the grower due to the perceived importance of

establishing Kentucky county court as the forum for the dispute. And it
appears the growers did not stop there. Within months, two Kentucky
Congressman introduced a bill to the House of Representatives. 7 . It
mandated that an H-2A worker could file suit against an H-2A employer
only in the county in which the worker was employed."' Also, within

months, a U.S. Senator from Kentucky announced that he was going to
investigate the legal services program representing the H-2A group for

allegedly "using federal funds to sue farmers in several states"-which,
ironically enough, is the very activity which the migrant legal services

grant monies have been designed to support. 49
Why have Kentucky tobacco growers clung to their county courts?
Possibly because tobacco is king in these counties," and the growers
can count on the king to influence the judge or the jury.2' Notably, all
Mar. 23, 1995) ("[A] state court defamation suit filed in retaliation for making an EEOC charge
clearly violates Title VII."); EEOC v. Levi Strauss & Co., 515 F. Supp. 640, 643 (N.D. II1. 1981)
("There is little doubt that a state court defamation action filed in retaliation for having engaged in
conduct protected by § 704(a), including the filing of a charge with the Commission, violates this
section."); see also Bill Johnson's Rest., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731,744 (1983) ("[We hold that it
is an enjoinable unfair labor practice to prosecute a baseless lawsuit with the intent of retaliating
against an employee for the exercise of rights protected by § 7 of the NLRA.").
247. See Congressman Plans Bill Aimed at Lawsuits, MONtTOR (McAllen, Tex.), Apr. 22,
2000, at 8C.
248. See id.
249. Legal Group's Farm Lawsuits Investigated, LUBBOCK AvALANcHE-J., Nov. 18, 1999, at
Al.
250. The University of Kentucky reports that "Kentucky is the most tobacco-dependent state in
the United States." Will Snell & Stephan Goetz, Overview of Kentucky's Tobacco Economy,
available at http:lwww.ca.uky.edulagclpubslaec/aec83/aec83.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2001). It's
nearly $1 billion tobacco crop accounts for 50% of the state's crop receipts. See Kentucky Tobacco
Farming, available at http://www.clev.frb.org/research/et97/0897/kentob.htm (last visited Apr. 10,
2001); Will Snell & Stephan Goetz, Overview of Kentucky's Tobacco Economy, available at
http:llwww.ca.uky.edulagc/pubslaeclaec83/aec83.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2001); Randy Weckman,
Kentucky
Tobacco
Sales
Expected
to
Top
$900
Million,
available at
http://www.ca.uky.edu/agc/news/1998/Nov/kytobacc.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2001); William M.
Snell, Kentucky's Tobacco Economy Important, Controversial, and Uncertain, 5 FORESIGHT
(1998), available at http://www.kltprc.net/Foresight/Chpt13.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2001).
Tobacco is especially important in the rural counties where it is grown on so many small farms, see
William Snell, Kentucky's Tobacco Economy Important, Controversial, and Uncertain, 5
FOREsIGHT (1998), available at http://www.kltpre.net/Foresight/Chpt3.htm (last visited Feb. 2,
2001), and where more than five percent of the total personal income derives from tobacco fanning.
See id. (noting that five percent is a significant figure).
251. Judges could be influenced because they are all elected in Kentucky. See KY. CONST. §
117; William H. Fortune & Sarah N. Welling, CriminalProcedure,72 KY. L.J 381, 396 (1983-84).
Even if the judge is completely neutral, the jury could be prejudiced. If an H-2A worker draws an
impartial judge, it may be possible to obtain a transfer of venue due to the likelihood of bias in the
fact-finder. See Plaintiff's Motion for Change of Venue at 1-7, 10, Buenrostro v. Wash. State Apple
Adver. Comm'n, No. 87-2-00491-5 filed, (Wash. Super. Ct. Chelan County Oct. 1, 1987)
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Kentucky state judges are elected, 2 and eighty-one percent of
Kentuckians polled indicated that they believe their state court system is
influenced by politics.23

Furthermore, these counties are culturally alien to Mexican H-2A
workers. For example, Graves County is approximately ninety-three
percent white and ninety-eight percent Protestant.2 Moreover, in rural
Kentucky there are regular reports of discrimination against Latino

migrants or immigrants!

5

In the year 2000, a state legislator from

Graves County testified to Kentucky's House State Government

Committee: "'Whenever [Hispanic immigrants] come into a community,
those people bring quite a bit of disease with them.' ' ,2 6 Another
legislator from western Kentucky agreed that immigrants-described as

"'mostly your Mexicans"'-have caused problems in his region. z7
In sum, given the greater existence of local bias in Southern state
courts in rural regions, the influence of agricultural operations in many
such regions, and the possibility that both officials and citizens of many

of those same regions hold anti-Latino sentiments, an H-2A worker runs
a substantial risk of prejudice when he seeks to enforce his bargain with
(transferring venue to an urban county where 43.2% of the county's workers were directly
employed by the apple industry and where the local papers had repeatedly run stories criticizing the
migrant farmworkers' suit) (on file with the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal).
252. See KY. CONST. § 117; Fortune & Welling, supranote 255, at 396.
253. See Kim Wessel, Public Distrust of Courts Worries State's Chief Justice, COVRIER-J.,
June 12, 2000, at BI (reporting that less than half of the people polled felt the state courts were
"'good').
254. See U.S. Census Bureau,
Graves County,
Ky. (2000) available at
http://factfinder.census.gov/bf/-lang=en-vLname=DEC2000-PL-U-QTPLgeo id=05000US
(last visited Apr. 1, 2001). In contrast, the counties comprising the Texas border region, where the
Graves county growers aimed to avoid litigation, are largely Hispanic. In the five border counties
that are home to a federal district court (i.e., El Paso, Val Verde, Webb, Hidalgo, and Cameron), the
percentage of Hispanic residents in the total population ranges from seventy-eight percent to ninetyfive percent. See 28 U.S.C. § 124(b), (d)(1994); U.S. Census Bureau (2000) available at
http://factfinder.census.gov (last visited Apr. 1, 2001).
255. See, e.g., Margaret Ramirez, Study FindsSegregation of Latinos in Catholic Church, L.A.
TIMes, Mar. 1, 2000, at Al (reporting that most of the problems of racism within congregations
"were in Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana and Tennessee-all areas where Mexican immigrants have
moved in recent years, primarily to find jobs in agriculture"); Michael Pearson, HispanicMigrants
Face Being Mistaken for Fugitive, ASSOCIATED PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE, June 23, 1999;
Around the Commonwealth, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 15, 2000, at BlA; Hefling, supra note
148, at 2000 WL 30318173 (stating that in rural Kentucky "cultural and communication barriers
often divide longtime residents and the growing population of Hispanic workers").
256. Around the Commonwealth, supra note 259, at B1A. Ironically, Mexican authorities
lament that Mexican immigrants acquire the AIDS virus while working in the U.S. and then infect
local populations when they return home. See Health & Science Briefly, ORANGE CouNTY REG.,
Feb. 4, 1997, at A12.
257. See Around the Commonwealth, supra note 259, at BlA.
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a grower in a local trial court. It would be rash to claim that an H-2A
worker cannot get fair treatment in a state court, but it appears there is a
significant risk that local bias will substantially diminish his or her
chances.
4. Federal Statutes and Regulations Largely Deny H-2A Workers
Access to the Legal Services Used By Farmworkers
Not only has federal law left H-2A workers without an adequate
forum for protecting their rights, it has also denied them adequate access
to legal representation. As a practical matter, the only legal assistance
5 This rule
that any farmworker is likely to get is from legal services.2
holds even more firmly for an H-2A worker who has fewer resources
and ties to U.S. institutions than does the domestic farmworker. In order
to effectively assert their rights, H-2A workers-who are poor, Spanishspeaking, unfamiliar with American institutions, and domiciled in
Mexico-need free legal representation more than any other group of
farmworkers.
Theirs is a need largely unattended. The Legal Services Corporation
("LSC") earmarks certain grants to legal aid programs for the
representation of migrant farmworkers 759 However, LSC grant monies
are scarce and come with special restrictions on the representation of H2A workers. °
First, LSC grants provide approximately $10.00 per potential client
per year to legal aid organizations."6' The vast majority of this funding is
used to handle rudimentary problems.262 On average, legal aid programs
spend only $150 per client, and more than ninety percent of the cases are
resolved without going to court.26 These statistics suggest migrant
farmworkers infrequently manage to persuade a legal aid organization to
file a suit on their behalf. When they do, they often face a well-funded
opponent who can wear them down.2 '
Second, LSC-funded programs are prohibited from representing
258. See ROTHENBERG, HANDS, supranote 13, at 229; Patiflo, supra note 16, at 44.
259. See ROTHENBERG, HANDS, supranote 13, at 229.
260. See id. at 229-30.
261. See MaintainingLegalAidfor the Poor,TAMPA TRIB., July 31, 1999, at 14.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See ROTHENBERG, HANDS, supra note 13, at 231 (as a long-time farmworker advocate
describes it as "[o]ur problem is that the legal system allows a well-funded defendant to delay,
harass, intimidate, and harangue long enough to avoid liability unless our side is willing to dig in for
the long fight.").
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The 1986 amendments to the H-2A

program provides H-2A workers with an exception to this categorical
prohibition. 266 However, this apparent boon for H-2A workers is largely
illusory due to restrictions placed on communications with H-2A
workers. 267' LSC regulations have been interpreted as prohibiting LSCfunded programs from conducting outreach in other countries, and thus
H-2A workers are effectively denied the opportunity to make their

complaints from the safety of their own communities.2 6' Rather, in order
for an H-2A worker to gain representation, he usually needs to contact
the legal aid program while working in the United States-that is, while
housed at the
grower's labor camp or during the brief transit period back
26 9

to Mexico.
Significantly enough, grower associations and lobbies have long

pushed to deprive migrant workers of access to LSC-funded programs.27°
In 1996, significant restrictions were placed on all LSC programs,
largely at the behest of the growers' lobby. In February 2001, an
especially disturbing deal was cut between the Virginia Farm Bureau,
the Virginia Seafood Council and the Legal Services Corporation of

Virginia.2' Those two growers' organizations were pushing state
legislation which would impose significant restrictions on the use of all
state funding for legal services.2 3 These attacks apparently were levied

against Virginia's legal services as a direct response to the success of
265. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104134, § 504(a)(11)(B)(F), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-53 to 1321-55 (1996) (prohibiting use of LSC funds
to assist any person or entity that provides legal assistance to undocumented aliens); 45 C.F.R. §§
1626.5- .11 (2000).
266. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 305, 100 Stat.
3359,3434 (1986) (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994)).
267. See generally45 C.F.R. § 1626.5 -. 11. See infra note 268 and accompanying text.
268. See Ken Boehm, Legal Services Corporation Uses "Special Commission" and Illegal
Closed Door Meetings to Give Lawyers the Green Light to Sue Growers on Behalf of Aliens Not
Presentin the United States, GEORGIA FRUIT & VEGETABLE GROWER NEWS, Summer 2000, at 14.
269. See id. Perhaps an H-2A workers' best chance at getting representation is from a legal aid
program that does not accept Legal Services Corporation funding, and therefore is not restricted in
who they can serve. These programs are becoming more common, although they remain scarce,
given the difficulty of obtaining the private funding needed to operate such an organization.
270. See BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, The Farm Bureau, in HIDDEN AGENDAS: WHAT IS
REALLY BEHIND ATTACKS ON LEGAL AID LAWYERS?, 5-10 (2001) (describing history of efforts
and stating that "[flor several decades, LSC--or rather its elimination-has been one of the Farm
Bureau's hot-button issues").
271. See id. at 7-8; In the Kingdom of Big Sugar,VANITY FAIR, Feb. 2001, at 178.
272. See Jennifer Bier, Left Out in Cold: Deal Costs Migrant Workers Their Counsel,
LAW.COM,
available
at
http://www5.law.com/la.. /displayid.cfm?statename=DC&id=
68691&table--news&flag=fu1 (last visited Feb. 27,2001).
273. See id.
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legal aid lawyers representing migrant workers. 27 4 The deal struck by the
growers and the LSC of Virginia was that the growers would drop their
legislation seeking across-the-board restrictions, while LSC of Virginia
would agree to stop funding the representation of migrant workers in
employment matters.25 As a recent newsletter aimed at H-2A employers
shows, growers' associations are attempting to put the same kind of
pressure specifically on those legal services programs that represent H2A workers. These growers associations aim to prohibit LSC-funded
programs from representing H-2A workers in any way once they have
been shipped back to Mexico, essentially making it impossible for them
to enforce their rights in court. 6
5. Summary: H-2A Workers are Left Without a Viable Means of
Enforcing Their Substantive Rights
The handicaps imposed by federal law tend to make H-2A workers
more "dependable" than their domestic counterparts. Unlike all other
farmworkers in the United States, H-2A workers are not entitled to sue
in any federal court where personal jurisdiction may be established.
Unlike all domestic farmworkers, H-2A workers are limited by the law
as to when and how they may gain legal assistance from LSC-funded
legal aid programs. These handicaps collectively make it unlikely that
even the rare H-2A worker who is bold enough to risk retaliation and
blacklisting will actually be able to enforce his rights. Even if an H-2A
worker does find a lawyer willing and able to sue a recalcitrant grower,
it is likely that the H-2A worker's only legal recourse will be to file a
suit in the grower's local county court. Such a suit would be of
questionable effectiveness, giving the H-2A worker little negotiating
leverage and scant hope of ultimate relief.
The H-2A worker is the latest incarnation of the juridically
handicapped-i.e. handicapped by laws and legal institutionsfarmworker in American society. Effectively, the current generation of
guest workers has been deprived of a voice to protect themselves. The
lamentable fact is that this deprivation appears to be the consequence of
design, rather than circumstance, because it results in a large part from
deliberate decisions of Congress, the courts and the Labor Department.
Thus, the H-2A program appears to be yet another example of how

274. See BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, supranote 270, at 10.
275. See Bier, supra note 272.
276. See Boehm, supranote 268, at 14.
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agribusiness has been able to use its political clout to gain
insurmountable legal advantages over its workforce. These advantages
essentially allow growers to rely on the exercise of coercive force, rather
than on the offer of a competitive wage rate, to get workers to complete
the difficult, dangerous and short-term tasks that must be done to bring
produce to market.
IV. PUTrING H-2A WORKERS ON EQUAL FOOTING WITH DOMESTIC
FARMWORKERS
"What sort of right is it which enjoys absolutely no procedural
protection?"277
It is a maxim of equity that no right should be without a remedy.
The logic behind this maxim is simple and pragmatic: if a right has no
remedy, then that right is, as a practical matter, meaningless. A right that
grants its holder nothing tangible-no compensation, no injunctive
relief, no specific performance-is tantamount to being no right at all.
Pursuant to the mandatory terms of their H-2A contracts, an H-2A
worker has substantive rights that are relatively generous compared to
those of other farmworkers. Theoretically, the remedy for a breach of
these rights is crystal clear: actual and consequential contract damages.
However, in practice, these remedies do not exist because an H-2A
worker has such a slim chance of ever enforcing these rights when the
grower does not voluntarily respect them. 9
At the very least, H-2A workers should be put on equal footing
with domestic farmworkers in terms of being endowed with the ability to
enforce their substantive rights.2s° This equalization could largely be
achieved by removing the special handicaps, now in place, against H-2A
workers. First and foremost, Congress should rescind the provision of
AWPA denying AWPA coverage to H-2A workers. There is no sound
277. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 900 (1961)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); see also GALARZA,supra note 58, at 165.
278. See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U. S.60, 66 (1992); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); Supplee Hardware Co. v. Driggs, 13 App. D.C. 272,
279 (D.C. Cir. 1898). But see Knight v. Town of Glocester, 831 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1987).
279. See ROTHENBERG, HANDS, supra note 13, at 236-37 (stating that a Labor Department
investigator with thirty years of experience estimates that at least fifty percent of growers are in
serious non-compliance with laws governing the employment of farmworkers, and that no grower is
in full compliance).
280. Of course, domestic farmworkers themselves have relatively little chance of asserting
their own rights under AWPA since they work in an atmosphere of fear and intimidation, see Beliz
v. W.H. McLeod & Sons Packing Co., 765 F.2d 1317, 1332 (5th Cir. 1985), and legal representation
is so scarce.
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policy justification for this exclusion, which sets H-2A workers apart
from all other farmworkers. Second, because aggrieved H-2A workers
face such difficulties in gaining legal assistance, LSC-funded programs
should be allowed to represent any H-2A worker with respect to H-2A
employment grievances, regardless of when and how the H-2A worker
came in contact with the legal aid program.&' Furthermore, because they
work so far from home and are tied to a single employer, H-2A workers
should be granted certain additional procedural advantages to put them
on an equal footing with domestic workers. Domestic workers can
usually sue their former employers in the judicial district where they live
because they can establish personal jurisdiction over a grower when the
grower has recruited that worker near his home. Of course, H-2A
workers cannot sue in federal court in their homes in Mexico. However,
it is likely that it will be more feasible for the workers and their legal
representatives to sue the grower somewhere other than the district
where the grower works. Most likely, the most convenient place for an
H-2A worker to file suit is where he finds legal representation-in an
urban center or in another state on the route home. For this reason, in
order to participate in the H-2A program, a grower should be required to
consent to personal jurisdiction in any state the worker must pass
through on his journey directly from home to the work site.
These changes to federal law should be made to justify the mere
continuance of the current H-2A program for a relatively small number
of workers. That is, without these modifications, the current H-2A
program is indefensible for the simple reason that it creates a class of
farmworkers with a significantly diminished ability to enforce their
rights. As shown below, provisions of both federal law and NAFTA
indicate that it is improper for the H-2A statutes and regulations to create
such a class of comparatively disadvantaged guest workers.
A. The Bedrock Principleof the H-2A ProgramRequires that H-2A and
U.S. Workers Be on an Equal Footing
The principle, which officially guides the formation and
administration of the H-2A program is the "no adverse effect" principle that the use of guest workers must not adversely affect domestic workers
and their working conditions. Since federal law ensures that an H-2A
worker is more vulnerable than a domestic worker, growers have more
281. This proposal seeks only to get rid of the "present in the U.S." requirement, not
solicitation rules in general. See Boehm, supra note 268, at 14.
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freedom to take economic advantage of H-2A workers by engaging in
the following cost-saving practices: (1) hiring excess workers to create
an army of reserve labor at the work site, which allows the grower to
keep workers fresh by working them just a few hours a day, to fire
workers who assert their rights, and to even lease workers out to other
farmers in the area; (2) providing dangerous transportation; (3)
providing ramshackle housing; and, (4) engaging in illegal payment
schemes to reduce the wages paid to workers; for example, by paying
workers an inadequate piece rate or taking illegal deductions from their
pay for food, housing or transportation. 2
These types of practices undermine the working conditions for
domestic farmworkers because when a grower subjects domestic
workers to such abuses, the grower runs a comparatively significant risk
of facing an enforcement action.2 3 In other words, a grower cannot abuse
domestic workers with as much confidence that he will never have to
pay for those abuses. For example, thanks to AWPA, if a grower
wrongfully terminates a domestic worker, that worker just might go
home, find a Legal Services lawyer, and file suit in federal court
hundreds or thousands of miles away.24 In contrast, if a grower
wrongfully terminates an H-2A worker, that worker will be sent straight
back to Mexico (or Jamaica, or the Dominican Republic), blacklisted,
and effectively silenced forever.25 At worst, if the worker is willing to
risk further retaliation and manages to find legal assistance, that worker
may bring suit in the grower's local county court. Or the Labor
Department might take administrative steps to collect wages owed, but it
is unlikely it will even impose a fine which would serve to deter other
violations. 6
In sum, the practical effect of the inequality between H-2A and
domestic workers with respect to their procedural rights is to undermine
the working conditions of all farmworkers in the United States. Yet
Congress and the courts have repeatedly emphasized that the H-2A
program aims to avoid precisely this type of adverse effect on domestic
working conditions. In order to preserve that fundamental goal of the H2A program, it is necessary to ensure that H-2A workers have equal

282. These are the types of violations reported by the few H-2A workers who have dared and
managed to voice their complaints in recent years.
283. Seegupra Section ll.B.5.
284. See supra notes 82-84, 87 and accompanying text.
285. See supra Part II.B.4.
286. See Glascock, supra note 6, at IA (reporting that a grower who failed to pay over
$i00,000 in back wages was fined just $650 for that failure).
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access to legal assistance and to the federal courts. That is, just as an H2A worker needs one hundred square feet of living space in order to
protect domestic workers, he also needs equal access to legal remedies in
order to protect his domestic counterparts. Ironically enough, in light of
the "no-adverse-effect" principle, courts have denied H-2A workers an
implied right of action to enforce their substantive rights in federal court,
reasoning that H-2A workers' substantive rights are designed to protect
domestic workers. Perhaps this logic is faulty because it arbitrarily stops
short: in order for the H-2A workers' substantive rights to actually
protect domestic workers, those rights need to be as readily enforceable
as the rights which domestic workers themselves enjoy.
B. The FederalGovernment is Not Doing Enough to Ensure that H-2A
Workers are Receiving the Minimal Due Processfor Employment
Complaints as Required Under NAFTA
Since ninety percent of H-2A workers are from Mexico," their
employment in the United States falls under the purview of the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") signed by Mexico and the
United States in 1992.f8 NAFTA includes a so-called side agreement on
labor issues, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
("NAALC"), which has some provisions relevant to the practice of
employing Mexican guest workers in the United States u 9 Although the
NAALC does not impose specific substantive standards for the
employment of guest workers,2" it does require that their employment
complaints be handled with a minimum of procedural care.2 '
The federal government does not seem to have acknowledged its
responsibility to ensure that Mexican guest workers are afforded certain
procedural rights. To begin, one could argue that as a matter of common
decency the federal government should bear the primary responsibility
for ensuring the fair treatment of the foreign nationals it allows to enter

287. See Martin, Economic, supranote 101, at 436.
288. See Canada-Mexico-United States: North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 605,664-66(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
289. See Canada-Mexico-UnitedStates: North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation,32
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1499, 1499(1993) [hereinafter NAALC].
290. The NAALC sets forth some "guiding principles that the Parties [i.e., Mexico and the
United States] are committed to promote, subject to each Party's domestic law." Id. at 1515. One of
these principles, Principle 11, establishes that the Parties must commit to "[piroviding migrant
workers in a Party's territory with the same legal protection as the Party's nationals in respect of
working conditions." Id. at 1516.
291. See id. at 1509-13..
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the United States as temporary "guests" in order to work and to profit
our national economy. Even the bracero program operated on the
assumption that this responsibility should be borne by the federal
government. Under the bracero program, if the Labor Department found
that back wages were owed to a bracero, the Department paid those
wages itself, and then sought restitution of the wages from the offending
grower.21 2 The current guest worker regime is not so hospitable. It is up
to today's H-2A worker to recover these wages directly from the grower,
by pressing the claim through administrative or judicial channels.
Recall the absurdity that may befall an H-2A worker who dares to
confront his former employer in such straits. The H-2A worker can
complain to the Labor Department and then wait for an answer that may
never come.293 Or, if the H-2A worker manages to obtain legal counsel,
he can try suing in federal court, but only if he happens to have a claim
based on a federal right that is his prerogative to enforce (unlike his
substantive employment rights guaranteed under the H-2A
regulations). 29 Or, the H-2A worker can try suing in state court where
the judges and juries may be biased in favor of the grower. 295 Finally, it
is always possible that the state, through a judicial ruling or a legislative
act, can close its courthouse doors to guest workers altogether, tossing
the political hot potato back to the federal government.
Perhaps the most important potential effect of NAFTA is to
highlight the responsibility that federal government should bear for the
protection of H-2A workers because, as mentioned above, by entering
the NAFTA treaty, the federal government has agreed to guarantee
certain minimum standards of treatment for Mexican guest workers.
Notably, under international law, the responsibility for fulfilling these
guarantees runs to the federal government (i.e., the party that entered the
treaty), not to the states. 96
At least in some circumstances, it could be argued that the federal
government's current regime for H-2A workers fails to satisfy the
requirements of NAFTA's labor side agreement, the NAALC, regarding
the minimal legal process owed to guest workers. The current remedies
292. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 309 F.2d 640, 644 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Morris, 252 F.2d 643, 644-455 (5th Cir. 1958).
293. See supraPart l.B.1.
294. See supraPart UI.B.2, 4.
295. See supraPart HI.B.3.
296. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 26-27 (2d ed. 1993).
Of course, the federal government has the duty under international law to take such measures as
may be necessary for making the provisions of treaties effective within its territories. See id. at 34,
84,90.
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made available to the federal government may be inadequate under
Articles 4 and 5 of the NAALC.
Article 4 states: "Each Party [viz. the signatory governments] shall
ensure that persons with a legally recognized interest under its law in a
particular matter have appropriate access to administrative, quasijudicial, judicial or labor tribunals for the enforcement of the Party's
labor law."2" There is no doubt that an H-2A worker has a "legally
recognized interest" to obtain the benefit of his bargain under an H-2A
contract, and so these workers have a right to "appropriate access" to a
forum to enforce those rights. Since the federal government has
excluded H-2A workers from AWPA coverage and has decided that an
H-2A worker has no private right of action under the H-2A regulations,
it appears to fulfill this forum requirement by providing an
administrative remedy and allowing suit in state court. But, let us look
again at these remedies.
The federal administrative remedy might not satisfy Article 5 of the
NAALC due to various flaws in the existing process. Article 5 requires
that an administrative proceeding used to enforce a guest worker's rights
must "not entail unreasonable charges or time limits or unwarranted
delays." 29 The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Coit Independence
suggests it is unwarranted to allow an administrative agency to delay
action on a complaint for an unlimited period of time.299 Moreover,
Article 5 requires that the decision-maker must issue a final decision on
the merits that is "in writing" and that "preferably state[s] the reason for
which the decision[] [is] based." 3' ° As explained earlier, if the Labor
Department simply declines to procure any relief for an aggrieved H-2A
worker, then the Department need not issue any statement whatsoeverthat is, it need not make a statement in writing, nor does it need to give
any reasons for its decision not to act on the complaint.'
The remaining question is whether the state court remedy is
adequate to satisfy the minimum process standards of the NAALC. It
may be argued that, as a practical matter, the cost to an indigent H-2A
worker of litigating in a foreign state court thousands of miles from
home is categorically "unreasonable," thereby rendering that forum
insufficient under Article 4. Apart from that potential flaw, however,
state courts apparently give Mexican H-2A workers the process due
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

NAALC, supranote 294, at 1503.
Id. at 1504.
See Coit Indep. Joint Venture v. Fed. Say. & Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 561, 587 (1989).
NAALC, supranote 294, at 1504.
See supra Part II.B.1. and text accompanying note 179.
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under the NAALC. Nevertheless, this resolution is unsatisfactory
because it is possible for state court judges to essentially bar H-2A
workers from suit in their state courts. In Joseph v. Okeelanta Corp.,"
and Aguirre v. Workman, 3 the trial judges ruled that the foreign guest
worker plaintiffs had to exhaust their potentially inexhaustible federal
administrative remedies before suing in a state court for a breach of
contract.' While these initial rulings of the trial judges were eventually
overturned on appeal, 3°5 they demonstrate that the United States'
compliance with NAFTA ultimately will turn on various decisions of
state court judges. It may not be unusual for the federal government to
place some reliance on states for the ultimate compliance with an
international treaty, but there is little reason for such reliance here. In
this case, such reliance on the states could be avoided by simply granting
H-2A workers the same AWPA coverage enjoyed by all other
farmworkers in the United States (documented and undocumented
alike). In that event, H-2A workers would unquestionably have recourse
to federal court.
V. CONCLUSION

In the last few decades, many U.S. companies have been moving
their manufacturing" and assembly plants offshore to take advantage of
foreign workers who have minimal legal protections, a lower cost of
living, and negligible bargaining power. Growers, unlike these
employers, cannot move their work sites to a foreign country, but they
can attempt to import a vulnerable, desperate workforce into the United
States. The rising demand for agricultural guest workers is i sign that
agribusiness is trying, like U.S. manufacturers, to tap into a source of
workers with fewer rights and lower expectations.
While the exploitation of workers is hardly defensible, when a
manufacturer takes advantage of vulnerable workers overseas, that

302. 656 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
303. No. 1998-CA-001367-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 8,2000).
304. See Joseph, 656 So. 2d at 1320; Aguirre, No. 1998-CA-001367-MR.
305. Appellate courts have consistently indicated that H-2A workers may sue without first
exhausting their federal administrative remedies. See Frederick County Fruit Growers Ass'n v.
Martin, 968 F.2d 1265, 1266-68 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Salazar-Calderon v. Presidio Valley Farmers
Ass'n, 765 F.2d 1334, 1339, 1340, 1341, 1353 (5th Cir. 1985); Nieto-Santos v. Fletcher Farms, 743
F.2d 638, 641 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984); Espinoza v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 641 F.2d 535, 536-37, 540
(7th Cir. 1981); W. Colo. Fruit Growers Ass'n v. Marshall, 473 F. Supp. 693, 696-97 (D. Colo,
1979); Okeelanta Corp. v. Bygrave, 660 So. 2d 743, 747 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Rowe v.
Grapevine Corp., 456 S.E.2d 1, 2-4 (W. Va. 1995).
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exploitation is at least taking place under the watch of the workers' own
government. Theoretically, those employees have a voice in their own
government; they can band together and protest or they can seek the help
of their own politicians, administrators, and judges. The same is true for
domestic farm workers in this country. In contrast, a guest worker has
absolutely no political weight in the country where he or she works."' A
guest worker is a stranger in a strange land. For this reason, it is
especially important that guest workers be given adequate legal
protections, including procedural protections that ensure as a practical
matter that their employers respect their formal rights. The current H-2A
regime falls far short of this mark because, rather than being used to
provide extra assistance to H-2A workers, the law has been used to put
them at a greater disadvantage.

306. As Galarza observed with respect to the bracero workers in the United States: "The law
placed the security of one class of citizens [viz., braceros, Mexican citizens] in the hands of a public
administration [viz., the Labor Department] which was in no effective manner responsive to them."
GALARZA, supranote 58, at 230.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

49

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 9

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol18/iss2/9

50

